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INTRODUCTION
any African governments have ratified numerous inter-
national and regional human rights instruments, in-
cluding the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights,1 the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights
(“African Charter”),2 the Protocol on the African Court on Hu-
man and Peoples’ Rights,3 the Protocol on the Statute of the
1. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966,
999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR].
2. African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, June 27, 1981, 21
I.L.M. 58 [hereinafter African Charter].
3. Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the
Establishment of the African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights, June 9,
1998, http://www.achpr.org/instruments/court-establishment/ [hereinafter
Protocol to the African Charter].
M
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African Court of Justice and Human Rights,4 and the Rome
Statute on the International Criminal Court (ICC),5 among
others. In ratifying these treaties, the States (countries) not
only commit themselves to promoting the realization and re-
spect for the rights provided for by these instruments,6 but also
to complying with the decisions of the judicial human rights
bodies empowered to adjudicate human rights violations. In the
case of human rights infringement, judicial human rights bod-
ies, such as the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights
(ACtHPR) or the African Commission of Human and Peoples’
Rights (“African Commission”), have several options in decid-
ing how to address the wrongdoing committed by a State party.
These bodies can order a State-violator to cease the violations
of human rights, prosecute those involved in the violations, re-
pair the damage caused to victims, and/or take other measures
reinforcing human rights.7 However, with no coercive power to
4. Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human
Rights, July 1, 2008, 48 I.L.M. 317 [hereinafter Protocol on the Statute of the
ACJHR]. In May 2012, the African countries’ representatives adopted their
own protocol. African Union, Draft Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol
on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights, at 8,
Exp/Min/IV/Rev.7 (May 15, 2012) [hereinafter Draft Protocol Amending
ACJHR Protocol], https://africlaw.files.wordpress.com/2012/05/au-final-court-
protocol-as-adopted-by-the-ministers-17-may.pdf. For the purpose of this ar-
ticle, the terms the “Protocol on the Statute of the ACJHR (for the old version
of the ACJHR Statute)” and the “Draft Protocol Amending the ACJHR Proto-
col (for the amended version incorporating the provisions dealing with the
ACJHR’s International Criminal Law Section)” will be used interchangeably.
5. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Rome Statute].
6. ICCPR, supra note 1, art. 1, para. 3.
7. See Democratic Republic of Congo v Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda,
Communication 227/99, African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights
[Afr. Comm’n H.P.R.], Holding (May 2003),
http://www.equalrightstrust.org/ertdocumentbank/DRC%20v%20Burundi,%2
0Rwanda%20and%20Uganda.pdf; Interights, ASADHO and Madam O. Disu
v. Democratic Republic of Congo, Communication 274/03 and 282/03, African
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights [Afr. Comm’n H.P.R.], ¶ 89 (Nov.
5, 2013),
http://www.achpr.org/files/sessions/54th/comunications/274.03_et_282.03_/ac
hpr54_decis__274_and_282_03_drc_2013_eng.pdf; Monim Elgak, Osman
Hummeida and Amir Suliman (represented by FIDH and OMCT) v Sudan,
Communication 379/09, African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights
[Afr. Comm’n H.P.R.], ¶ 142 (Mar. 12, 2014),
http://www.achpr.org/files/sessions/14th-
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enforce their decisions, the ACtHPR and the African Commis-
sion, as well as international courts, rely on the good faith of
the States to implement their remedial orders.8 Despite States’
commitments to respect human rights and comply with courts’
decisions, scholars examining the issue of State compliance
with human rights bodies’ decisions conclude that only a few
judgments rendered are actually implemented by the con-
cerned States.9 Most decisions are either partially enforced or
not enforced at all. This state of affairs leaves countless human
eo/comunications/379.09/achpr14eos_decis_379_09_sudan_eng.pdf; Egyptian
Initiative for Personal Rights and Interights v Arab Republic of Egypt, Com-
munication 334/06, African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights [Afr.
Comm’n H.P.R.], ¶ 233 (Mar. 3, 2011),
http://www.achpr.org/files/sessions/9th-
eo/comunications/334.06_/achpreos9_334_06_eng.pdf.
8. Gerald L. Neuman, Bi-Level Remedies for Human Rights Violations, 55
HARV. INT’L L. J. 323, 325 (2014).
9. Déborah Forst noted that the execution of judgments from the ECtHR
has been unsatisfactory. And as of
31 December 2011, among the more than 10,000 cases pending be-
fore the Committee of Ministers for the supervision of the execution
2,278 were leading cases, i.e. cases which have been identified as re-
vealing a new systemic/general problem in a respondent state, which
had been pending for more than five years. Moreover, 1354 of the
1696 new cases which became final between 1 January and 31 De-
cember 2011, were repetitive ones.
Déborah Forst, The Execution of Judgments of the European Court: Limits
and Ways Ahead, 7 VIENNA J. INT’L CONST. L., Feb. 2013, at 1, available at
https://www.icl-
jour-
nal.com/download/f1527ce403500a9ec58b8269a9a91471/ICL_Thesis_Vol_7_3
_13.pdf (last visited Oct. 20, 2015). Research conducted by Frans Viljoen and
Lirette Louw on State compliance with the recommendations of the African
Commission revealed that “only 14 percent of State parties comply fully and
in timely fashion with the decisions of the African Commission on Human
and Peoples’ Rights.” See Frans Viljoen & Lirette Louw, State Compliance
with the Recommendations of the African Commission on Human and Peo-
ples’ Rights: 1994–2004, 101 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 5 (2007). Statistics from studies
done on States’ compliance with human rights bodies decisions reveal that
only 6 percent of the IACtHR’s judgments are fully complied with by con-
cerned States, 83 percent are partially complied with, and 11 percent are not
complied with. See Darren Hawkins & Wade Jacoby, Partial Compliance A
Comparison of The European and Inter-American Courts of Human Rights, 6
J. INT’L L. & INT’L REL. 35, 56 (2010).
2015] From Commitment to Compliance 103
rights victims without justice and reparations for prejudices
endured.
This article explores some of the practical and legal reasons
preventing the enforcement of the decisions of human rights
courts in Africa. It posits that African States’ noncompliance or
partial compliance with human rights courts’ decisions is
linked to numerous variables. These variables include the polit-
icization of the postadjudicative phase, coupled with the lack of
sanctions against defaulting States; the nonexistence of a judi-
cial enforcement mechanism at regional and domestic levels;
the lack of participation of domestic courts in the enforcement
of international courts’ judgments; and the misuse of the notion
of sovereignty on judicial issues. This article also recommends
actions to increase the likelihood of enforceability of the human
rights courts’ remedial orders in Africa. Ultimately, this article
suggests certain legislative reforms at both the regional and
national level, to help create a special judicial enforcement re-
gime10 through which the domestic courts and National Human
Rights Institutions (“NHRIs”) will play a pivotal role in enforc-
ing judgments of international and regional human rights judi-
cial bodies. However, this article recognizes that this proposi-
tion, which would allow human rights victims and beneficiaries
of an international judgment to seek enforcement of the verdict
in their favor before the domestic court of the offending State,
may not be a perfect solution. This issue stems from the practi-
cal challenges in the administration of justice in some African
countries. For example, most judgments rendered in the Demo-
cratic Republic of Congo (DRC) by local tribunals on local dis-
putes are not implemented by the concerned parties. How can
these local tribunals enforce international judgments when
even their own decisions are not actually implemented?
This article is structured as follows: Part I will examine the
principal African human rights bodies (such as the African
Commission, the ACtHR, and the African Court of Justice and
Human Rights (ACJHR)), and explore the historical back-
ground of their establishments, powers, jurisdictions, and the
locus standi of these bodies. Part II will analyze the concept of
10. Richard F. Oppong, Enforcing Judgments of the SADC Tribunal in the
Domestic Courts of Member States, in MONITORING REGIONAL INTEGRATION IN
SOUTHERN AFRICA YEARBOOK 115, 116 (Anton Bösl et al. eds., 2010) (discuss-
ing the enforcement of international judgments).
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compliance and the challenges for international decisions’ en-
forcement. Part III proposes recommendations to increase the
rate of enforcement of international judgments.
I. SYNOPSIS OF AFRICANHUMAN RIGHTS BODIES
This Part will examine the historical background of the crea-
tion of the African human rights bodies and their powers, ju-
risdictions, and the locus standi of these bodies. This Part will
also discuss the relationship between these judicial bodies that
is governed by the principle of complementarity.
A. Historical Background
The African human rights system has gradually evolved since
the adoption of the African Charter in 1981, which constitutes
the “birth certificate” of African human rights bodies. To un-
derstand the development of the African human rights system,
it is important to first comprehend the philosophy that animat-
ed the Organization of African Unity (OAU), which is consid-
ered the “maternity” of all continental human rights instru-
ments in Africa.
The OAU was established on May 25, 1963, when the repre-
sentatives of thirty-two countries signed the OAU Charter.
Over the years, twenty-one other countries gradually joined the
OAU, culminating with South Africa, which became the fifty-
third member on May 23, 1994.11 The main objective of the
OAU was to end the colonization and apartheid in the African
continent; to promote unity among African States; to coordi-
nate cooperation for development; to safeguard the sovereignty
and territorial integrity of its members; and to promote inter-
national cooperation within the framework of the United Na-
tions.12 However, while addressing the issues of socioeconomic
rights, decolonization, and racial discrimination, the OAU
Charter lacked explicit obligations for its members in regards
11. Fordham O’Wara, Bibliographical Pathfinder: African System for the
Protection and Promotion of Human Rights, U. MINN. HUM. RTS. LIBR. (2002),
https://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/bibliog/africanpathfinder.html.
12. African Human Rights System, INFO. PLATFORM HUMANRIGHTS.CH,
http://www.humanrights.ch/en/standards/other-regions-instruments/african-
human-rights-s (last visited Apr. 12, 2015).
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to the protection of civil and political rights.13 As a result, nu-
merous massive violations of human rights were completely
ignored in Africa.14 The omission of human rights was at least
partly tied to the OAU Charter’s sacrosanct principle of nonin-
terference in the internal affairs of State members.15 Neverthe-
less, the international movement generated by both the 1950
adoption of the European Convention on Human Rights (estab-
lishing the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR)) and the
1969 entry into force of the Inter-American Convention of Hu-
man Rights (establishing the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights (IACtHR)) resonated throughout the African continent:
the establishment of a system protecting human rights in Afri-
ca became a necessity.16 It is in this context that the African
Charter and its 1998 Protocol were adopted to create judicial
human rights bodies in Africa with the fundamental mission of
mandating States to respect of the rights guaranteed by the
African Charter.17
B. Principal African Human Rights Bodies
The following section will analyze the principal African hu-
man rights bodies, including the African Commission of Hu-
man Rights, the African Court of Human Rights, and the fu-
ture ACJHR. It will particularly analyze the powers, jurisdic-
tions, and locus standi of these bodies.
1. African Commission of Human Rights
Article 30 of the African Charter created the African Com-
mission as a “quasi-judicial” body to monitor the implementa-
tion of the African Charter’s rights. Article 30 stipulates that
“An African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, here-
inafter called ‘the Commission,’ shall be established within the
Organization of African Unity to promote human and peoples’
13. History of the African Charter, AFR. COMMISSION ON HUM. & PEOPLES’
RTS., http://www.achpr.org/instruments/achpr/history (last visited Apr. 12,
2015).
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. INT’L FED’N FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, THE AFRICAN COURT ON HUMAN AND
PEOPLE’S RIGHTS: TOWARDS THE AFRICAN COURT OF JUSTICE AND HUMAN
RIGHTS 19–20 (2010) [hereinafter FIDH].
17. Id. at 22.
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rights and ensure their protection in Africa.”18 One may wonder
why the African Charter established a quasi-judicial body ra-
ther than simply providing for the creation of a court. The
travaux preparatoires of the African Charter reveal that the
majority of the treaty drafters rejected the idea of establishing
a Court to enhance the protection of human rights in order to
comply with the African legal traditions for the political set-
tlements of disputes.19 In establishing the African Commission
as a quasi-judicial organ, the African Charter conferred the Af-
rican Commission with a dual mandate of promoting and pro-
tecting human rights in the African continent.20
a. Jurisdiction and Standing
The African Commission performs its promotional mandate
by implementing several tasks, such as: collecting documents
and conducting research on African problems in the field of
human rights; organizing seminars, symposia, and conferences;
disseminating information, encouraging national and local in-
stitutions concerned with human rights, and making recom-
mendations to governments; formulating and developing prin-
ciples and rules relating to human rights to serve as the basis
for the adoption of legislation by African governments; and co-
operating with other African and international institutions
working in the field of the promotion and protection of human
rights.21 The African Commission’s promotional function also
includes gathering information on the situation of human
rights within a State party’s territory, raising awareness of the
African Charter, and improving the situation of human rights
in Africa.22 This catalog of promoting activities requires a sub-
stantial budget in order for the African Commission to effi-
ciently execute its duties. However, the African Commission
has long experienced a limited operating budget—for example,
its budget in 2007 was estimated at $1,000,000 USD and in
2009 at $3,600,000 USD; whereas the ECtHR's budget was
18. African Charter, supra note 2, art. 30.
19. FIDH, supra note 16, at 23.
20. Id. at 22.
21. African Charter, supra note 2, art. 45.
22. ORG. OF AFR. UNITY, INTERIM RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE AFRICAN
COMMISSION ON HUMAN AND PEOPLE’S RIGHTS, r. 74 para. 3 [hereinafter AFR.
COMM’N INTERIM RULES OF PROC.].
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about €56,000,000 (or $100,000,000 USD) in 2009.23 With re-
gards to its mandate of protecting human rights, the African
Commission’s competencies consist of sending promotional and
protection missions to States parties;24 receiving communica-
tions from States parties, nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs), and individuals for violations of human rights commit-
ted by a State party;25 adopting recommendations on the hu-
man rights situations in countries or on specific issues relating
to human rights;26 sending urgent appeals to States parties;27
scrutinizing State reports on legislative or other measures tak-
en to give effect to the rights guaranteed by the African Char-
ter and making recommendations in this regard;28 and inter-
preting the provisions of the African Charter at the request of a
State party, an institution of the African Union (AU), or an Af-
rican NGO recognized by the AU.29 From this description of the
protection mandate, it appears that the African Commission
has a broad jurisdiction over human rights issues, including
contentious and advisory jurisdictions. In addition, the African
Commission’s jurisdiction applies only to States that have rati-
fied the African Charter and its Protocol. Regarding the locus
standi, the African Commission can receive complaints from
States, NGOs, and individuals for violations of human rights
committed only by a State party.30 This means that the African
23. FIDH, supra note 16, at 23, 29.
24. AFR. COMM’N INTERIM RULES OF PROC., supra note 22, r. 24 para. 1.
25. African Charter, supra note 2, art. 47; see also Dawda Jawara v. The
Gambia, Communication 147/95–149/96, African Commission on Human and
People’s Rights [Afr. Comm’n H.P.R.] (May 11, 2000) [hereinafter Comm.
147/95–149/96],
http://www.achpr.org/files/sessions/27th/comunications/147.95-
149.96/achpr27_147.95_149.96_eng.pdf. In this case, the African Commission
received a complaint from an individual, who was the former Head of State of
the Republic of The Gambia. The complainant alleged the military junta, who
overthrew his government, violated his fundamental human rights. Id. paras.
1–10. In Ligue Camerounaise des Droits de l’Homme v. Cameroon, the African
Commission received a complaint submitted by an NGO. Ligue Came-
rounaise des Droits de l’Homme v. Cameroon, Communication 65/92, African
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights [Afr. Comm’n H.P.R.] (Apr.
1997), http://www.chr.up.ac.za/images/files/publications/ahrlr/ahrlr_2000.pdf.
26. AFR. COMM’N INTERIM RULES OF PROC., supra note 22, rule 95.
27. Id. r. 23, para. 4.
28. African Charter, supra note 2, art. 62.
29. Id. art. 45, para. 3.
30. Id. art. 47.
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Commission cannot adjudicate human rights violations in cases
committed by non-state actors or nonparty States. For exam-
ple, an individual cannot approach the African Commission for
the violation of human rights committed by another individual.
Accordingly, the African Charter set up specific criteria in or-
der for cases to be admitted to the African Commission.
b. Admissibility
The issue of admissibility of complaints before the African
Commission is regulated by Rule 105 of the African Commis-
sion Rules of Procedure,31 and Article 56 of the African Char-
ter.32 Indeed, Rule 105 of the Rules of Procedure specifically
deals with the process of admissibility and provides that once a
complaint is lodged, the African Commission will request a
complainant to present evidence and arguments on admissibil-
ity within two months.33 The African Commission will then
transmit a copy of the complaint to the responding State and
request it to submit its arguments and evidence within two
months from the time of its notification.34 Upon receiving the
responding State’s submissions, the complainant may then
comment on those submissions within a month.35
Article 56 of the African Charter sets up the criteria of ad-
missibility and stipulates that complaints on human rights vio-
lations can be admitted by the African Commission if the com-
plaints:
1. Indicate the authors of the complaint even if the latter re-
quests anonymity;
2. Are compatible with the Charter of the Organization of Af-
rican Unity or with the present Charter;
3. Are not written in disparaging or insulting language di-
rected against the State concerned and its institutions or to
the Organization of African Unity;
4. Are not based exclusively on news discriminated through
the mass media;
31. AFR. COMM’N INTERIM RULES OF PROC., supra note 22, r. 105.
32. African Charter, supra note 2, art. 56.
33. AFR. COMM’N INTERIM RULES OF PROC., supra note 22, r. 105.
34. Id. r. 105, para. 1.
35. Id. r. 105, para. 3.
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5. Are sent after the intervention of exhaustive local reme-
dies, if applicable, unless it is obvious that this procedure is
unduly prolonged;
6. Are submitted within a reasonable period from the time lo-
cal remedies were exercised or from the date the Commission
is seized of the matter; and
7. Do not deal with cases that have been settled by the States
involved in accordance with the principles of the Charter of
the United Nations, or the Charter of the Organization of Af-
rican Unity or the provisions of the present Charter.36
From the criteria listed above, it appears that there are seven
conditions of admissibility for cases brought before the African
Commission. In other words, a complaint would be declared
inadmissible by the African Commission if it is: filed anony-
mously, nonspecific about the rights violated, drafted in insult-
ing language, not based on the truth of facts, filed before ex-
hausting local remedies, filed at an unreasonable time, or pre-
viously settled by other (quasi) judicial international bodies.37
All seven criteria must be concurrently met,38 and a complain-
ant’s failure to comply with any of the requirements will result
in the rejection of his or her case.
In past years, the African Commission has dismissed numer-
ous complaints for their noncompliance with the provisions of
Article 56. Leading examples illustrating the implementation
of the admissibility criteria include the case Dioumessi and
Others v. Guinea,39 in which the African Commission held a
complaint inadmissible because of anonymity. In this case, the
African Commission implicitly concluded that an anonymous
communication implies not only the absence of the complain-
ant’s name, but also the lack or inaccuracy of contact infor-
mation. Furthermore, the African Commission declared the
complaint inadmissible because the complainant could not be
36. African Charter, supra note 2, art. 56.
37. EGYPTIAN INITIATIVE FOR PERSONAL RIGHTS ET AL., FILING A
COMMUNICATION BEFORE THE AFRICAN COMMISSION OF HUMAN AND PEOPLES’
RIGHTS 9–17 (2013),
http://www.redress.org/downloads/publications/1307%20Manual%20to%20the
%20African%20Commission.pdf.
38. Id.
39. Dioumessi and Others v. Guinea, Communication 70/92, African
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights [Afr. Comm’n H.P.R.], ¶ 13 (Oct.
1995), http://www.chr.up.ac.za/images/files/publications/ahrlr/ahrlr_2000.pdf
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reached at the provided address.40 The African Commission
upheld a similar position in the subsequent case of Joana v.
Madagascar.41 However, one may wonder what the African
Commission’s position would be if contact were reestablished
with a complainant at a future date. In Riffaat Makkawi v. Su-
dan,42 the African Commission reopened and admitted a com-
plaint that it had initially declared inadmissible for anonymity,
based on inaccurate contact information, when contact was
reestablished with the complainant.43
Another criterion for rejection of complaints relates to the use
of disparaging or insulting language directed against the con-
cerned State and its governing institutions. The terms “dispar-
aging” and “insulting” language are neither defined in the Afri-
can Charter nor clarified by the African Commission in its de-
cisions. In Ligue Camerounaise des Droits de l’Homme v. Cam-
eroon,44 the African Commission declared the complaint inad-
missible for insulting language because it contained statements
describing the Cameroonian government as a “regime of tor-
tures” and called for the Cameroonian president to “respond to
[the] crime against humanity” that was committed.45 However,
the African Commission did not explain with legal reasoning
how calling for a perpetrator of a crime against humanity to be
held responsible for his conduct amounts to “insulting lan-
guage.” In order to be considered insulting, the complaint’s
language should reach a certain degree of denigration or libel
rather than being merely cutting, polemical, or sarcastic.46 The
position of the African Commission may perhaps be explained
by extralegal or extrajudicial factors. Indeed, until recently
40. Id. para. 12.
41. Monja Joana v. Madagascar, Communication 108/93, African Commis-
sion on Human and Peoples’ Rights [Afr. Comm’n H.P.R.], ¶ 11 (Oct. 1996),
http://www.chr.up.ac.za/images/files/publications/ahrlr/ahrlr_2000.pdf
42. Rifaat Makkawi v. Sudan, Communication 311/05, African Commis-
sion on Human and Peoples’ Rights [Afr. Comm’n H.P.R.], ¶ 258 (Nov. 2010),
http://old.achpr.org/english/Session%20Report/48_OS%20report.pdf.
43. EGYPTIAN INITIATIVE FOR PERSONAL RIGHTS ET AL., supra note 37, at 9.
44. Ligue Camerounaise des Droits de l’Homme v. Cameroon, Communica-
tion 65/92, African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights [Afr. Comm’n
H.P.R.] (Apr. 1997),
http://www.chr.up.ac.za/images/files/publications/ahrlr/ahrlr_2000.pdf.
45. Id. ¶ 13.
46. EUR. COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, PRACTICAL GUIDE ON ADMISSIBILITY
CRITERIA 38 (2004).
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some members of the African Commission used to concurrently
hold other internal or external executive governmental posi-
tions in their respective countries, including minister or am-
bassador.47 As a result, it would be embarrassing, and possibly
jeopardizing to their domestic careers, for members of the Afri-
can Commission (particularly for those holding official func-
tions at home) to accept complaints criticizing their own gov-
ernments. Furthermore, the fact that certain members function
as both the judge and a party in a matter, may affect the inde-
pendence of the African Commission and lead to the frequent
rejection of complaints using critical language.48 Unlike the Af-
rican Commission, the ECtHR held that the complainant’s lan-
guage must exceed “the bounds of normal, civil and legitimate
criticism” in order to be perceived as insulting or abusive.49
An additional reason for the inadmissibility of most com-
plaints concerns the nonexhaustion of domestic remedies. Be-
fore approaching the African Commission, it is mandatory that
the complainant first pursue all legal and judicial mechanisms
available locally to resolve the matter.50 This requirement of
exhausting local remedies constitutes a part of customary in-
ternational law and is “based on the generally recognized rules
of international (human rights) law”51 that international hu-
man rights bodies are subsidiary to the domestic human rights
courts, giving the latter the privilege to first adjudicate human
rights violations.52 This stipulation prevents the international
tribunal from acting as a court of first instance; instead, inter-
national tribunals should serve as a body of last resort.53 Ac-
cordingly, a complaint would be declared inadmissible by the
African Commission if the case was still pending before the
domestic tribunal or if the complainant failed to follow appro-
priate and available local judicial avenues. In Majuru v Zimba-
bwe, the African Commission dismissed the complaint for non-
47. FIDH, supra note 16, at 24.
48. Id.
49. EUR. COURT OFHUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 46, at 38.
50. EGYPTIAN INITIATIVE FOR PERSONAL RIGHTS ET AL, supra note 37, at 10–
11.
51. EUR. COURT OFHUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 40, at 22.
52. Id.
53. Majuru v Zimbabwe, Communication 308/2005, African Commission on
Human and People’s Rights [Afr. Comm’n H.P.R.], ¶ 77 (Nov. 24, 2008),
http://www.achpr.org/files/sessions/44th/comunications/308.05/achpr44_308_0
5_eng.pdf.
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compliance with the requirement of exhaustion of local reme-
dy.54 However, to determine the complainant’s compliance with
this requirement, the African Commission focused on the
availability, effectiveness, and sufficiency of local remedies. In
Jawara v The Gambia,55 the African Commission stated that,
“A remedy is considered available if the petitioner can pursue it
without impediment; it is deemed effective if it offers a prospect
of success; and it is found sufficient if it is capable of redressing
the complaint.”56 The burden of proof for the existence and ex-
haustion of local remedies weighs on the complainant by virtue
of the principle actori incumbit probation. Once the complain-
ant meets their burden, it then shifts to the State to demon-
strate why remedies were not previously exhausted and how
there are remedies available that can be used to solve the com-
plaint.57 This is the application of the procedural principle in
excipiendo reus fit actor. Nevertheless, the exhaustion of local
remedies is not an absolute requirement, and there are limita-
tions to this criterion. The circumstances under which the ex-
haustion of local remedies is not a requirement include: the
ousting of jurisdiction of courts;58 unduly prolonged remedies;59
54. Id. ¶ 112.
55. Comm. 147/95–149/96, supra note 25.
56. Id. ¶ 32.
57. EGYPTIAN INITIATIVE FOR PERSONAL RIGHTS ET AL., supra note 37, at 12.
58. Id. at 13 (discussing the concept that the ousting of the court’s jurisdic-
tion is, for example, where a State-party has promulgated laws nullifying the
jurisdiction of ordinary courts). See also Civil Liberties Organisation v. Nige-
ria, Communication 151/96, African Commission on Human and Peoples’
Rights [Afr. Comm’n H.P.R.], ¶ 14 (1999),
http://www.achpr.org/files/sessions/26th/comunications/151.96/achpr26_151_9
6_eng.pdf. In Civil Liberties Org v Nigeria, the African Commission upheld
Nigeria’s military government by adopting decrees ousting the jurisdiction of
ordinary courts that had rendered the local remedies nonexistent, ineffective,
or illegal. Id.
59. This situation occurs when there is an undue and unjustifiable prolon-
gation of the case in the domestic courts. In Odjouoriby Cossi Paul v. Benin,
the African Commission declared the complaint admissible after concluding
that there was an undue delay of the Complainant’s case before the national
courts:
The complaint filed the appeal against the judgment of the court of
first instance is dated 19th September 1995 and the Commission was
seized of the case on 8th April 1997, that is 20 months after the filing
of the appeal. It appears from the practice of the Appeal Court ac-
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the element of fear;60 and the situation of serious human rights
violations.61
Moreover, a complaint can be declared inadmissible if it is
filed at an unreasonable time after local remedies were ex-
hausted. Previously, the African Commission seemed to be “in-
dulgent” in interpreting the “reasonable time” requirement.62
Some complaints were declared admissible even after being
dormant up to sixteen years following the exhaustion of domes-
tic remedies.63 However, after drawing inspiration from the
IACtHR and ECtHR, the African Commission became more
stringent in interpreting the “reasonable time” requirement.64
In Michael Majuru v. Zimbabwe, the African Commission held
that,
The provisions of other international regional instruments
like the European Convention on Human Rights and Funda-
mental Freedoms and the Inter-American Convention on
Human Rights, are almost similar and state that they . . .
cepted by the Supreme Court that average period ranges between 4
and 5 years.
See Odjouoriby Cossi Paul v. Benin, Communication 199/1997, African Com-
mission on Human and People’s Rights [Afr. Comm’n H.P.R.], ¶ 28 (2004),
http://www.achpr.org/files/sessions/35th/comunications/199.97/achpr35_199_9
7_eng.pdf.
60. EGYPTIAN INITIATIVE FOR PERSONAL RIGHTS ET AL., supra note 37, at 14.
(“When the complainant has, out of fear, fled his/her own country where the
alleged violation of human rights took place, and he/she could not therefore
exhaust domestic remedies.”); see also, e.g., John D. Ouko v. Kenya, Commu-
nication 232/99, African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights [Afr.
Comm’n H.P.R.], ¶ 31 (2000),
http://www.achpr.org/files/sessions/28th/comunications/232.99/achpr28_232_9
9_eng.pdf. In Ouko v. Kenya, by contrast, the African Commission found that
there were elements of fear for the complainant and declared his complaint
admissible. Id.
61. In DR Congo v. Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda, the African Commis-
sion noted that in the case where the violations of human rights are being
perpetrated by the respondent States in the territory of the complainant
State, the requirement of local remedies should not exist and the question of
their exhaustion cannot therefore arise. See Democratic Republic of Congo/
Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda, Communication 227/1999, African Commission
on Human and People’s Rights [Afr. Comm’n H.P.R.], ¶ 63 (2003),
http://caselaw.ihrda.org/doc/227.99/view/en/.
62. EGYPTIAN INITIATIVE FOR PERSONAL RIGHTS ET AL, supra note 37, at 15.
63. Id.
64. Id.
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may only deal with the matter . . . within a period of six
months from the date on which the final decision was taken . .
. after this period has elapsed they will no longer entertain
the communication.65
In this case, the African Commission declared the complaint
inadmissible for being filed twenty-two months after the ex-
haustion of local remedies.66 Thereby, the African Commission
set the standard for a “reasonable time” period at six months.67
Additionally, complaints will only be admissible if they were
not previously settled or pending before other international ju-
dicial bodies similar to the African Commission, such as the
U.N. Human Rights Committee. Accordingly, in Mpaka-Nsusu
v. Zaire, the African Commission dismissed the complaint be-
cause it had already been referred to the Human Rights Com-
mittee based on the violation of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights.68 In this case, the African Commis-
sion’s position might have been motivated by the necessity of
respecting the non bis in idem principle. Yet, the African
Commission can still accept complaints that were discussed by
nonjudicial international bodies, such as United Nation’s sub-
commission and special rapporteurs.69
Finally, complaints must specially address the violation of
rights guaranteed in the African Charter rather than being an
unclear statement concerning the general political situation of
65. Majuru v Zimbabwe, Communication 308/2005, African Commission on
Human and People’s Rights [Afr. Comm’n H.P.R.], ¶ 108 (2008),
http://www.achpr.org/files/sessions/44th/comunications/308.05/achpr44_308_0
5_eng.pdf.
66. Id. ¶ 110.
67. EGYPTIAN INITIATIVE FOR PERSONAL RIGHTS ET AL., supra note 37, at 15.
68. Mpaka-Nsusu Andre Aphonse v. Zaire, Communication 15/1988, Afri-
can Commission on Human and People’s Rights [Afr. Comm’n H.P.R.], ¶ 2
(1988),
http://www.achpr.org/files/sessions/5th/comunications/15.88/achpr5_15_88_en
g.pdf.
69. EGYPTIAN INITIATIVE FOR PERSONAL RIGHTS ET AL., supra note 37, at 16;
see also Bakweri Land Claims Committee v. Cameroon, Communication
260/2002, African Commission on Human and People’s Rights [Afr. Comm’n
H.P.R.], ¶¶ 49–53 (2004),
http://www.achpr.org/files/sessions/36th/comunications/260.02/achpr36_260_0
2_eng.pdf. In Bakweri Land Claims Committee v. Cameroon, the African
Commission declared the complaint admissible despite that the matter was
initially discussed by the U.N. Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimina-
tion and Protection of Minorities. Id.
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the responding State.70 In addition, complaints should not be
based solely on media reports; they must substantiated by oth-
er material evidence establishing the truth of the facts.71
The procedure before the African Commission is quasi-
judicial by nature. Through this quasi-judicial process, the Af-
rican Commission is charged with enforcing the rights guaran-
teed in the African Charter72 by formulating nonlegally binding
recommendations (as final decisions) to the respondent
States.73 This means that State violators of human rights do
not have a legal obligation to comply with the African Commis-
sion’s decisions in regards to the complaints lodged against
them. The lack of binding decisions of the African Commission,
combined with its delay in adjudicating cases,74 has led to the
calling for judicial bodies capable of rendering decisions with
binding effects.
2. ACtHPR
As previously mentioned, unlike the European and Inter-
American Conventions on Human Rights, the African Charter
does not establish a judicial human rights body. However, ow-
ing to institutional weaknesses, lack of resources, the nonbind-
ing effects of decisions, and the lack of decisional implementa-
tion, there was a need to create a more “powerful” continental
judicial body to fill the gaps of the African Commission. As a
result, the Protocol to the African Charter establishing the AC-
tHPR was adopted in 1998,75 and entered into force in 2004 af-
ter its ratification by fifteen countries.76 The ACtHPR was cre-
ated with the clear mission of both complementing and enhanc-
ing the protective mandate of the African Commission.77
70. EGYPTIAN INITIATIVE FOR PERSONAL RIGHTS ET AL., supra note 37, at 9.
71. Id. at 10.
72. FIDH, supra note 16, at 26.
73. African Charter, supra note 2, art. 45, para. 1(a).
74. The timeframe for the review of complaints before the African Com-
mission varies, but is often too long-ranging. The timeframe often lasts be-
tween two and eight years. See Mohamed L. Diakite v. Gabon, No. 73/1992,
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights [Afr. Comm’n on H.P.R.]
(May 11, 2000), http://corteidh.or.cr/tablas/22425.pdf (rendering a decision on
a case in 2000 in which the complaint was brought before the African com-
mission in 1992); FIDH, supra note 16, at 26.
75. Id. at 29–30.
76. Protocol to the African Charter, supra note 3, art. 34, para. 3.
77. Id. art. 2.
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a. Powers and Jurisdictions
The ACtHPR has the power to adjudicate the compliance of
State parties with the provisions of the African Charter and
other international and regional human rights instruments du-
ly ratified by those countries. Accordingly, the ACtHPR has
advisory, arbitral, and contentious jurisdiction. As an advisory
court, the ACtHPR provides its opinions on any matter relating
to the protection of human rights or any relevant human rights
instruments at the request of State members, AU organs, and
African organizations recognized by the AU.78 The subject mat-
ter for advisory opinions cannot relate to the request pending
before the African Commission; this requirement aims to avoid
a conflict of jurisdiction between the African Commission and
the ACtHPR.79
Additionally, the ACtHPR is competent to serve as an arbi-
tral body, where it can amicably settle cases brought before it.80
The arbitral competence of the ACtHPR resembles a diplomatic
function through which the court must use amicable approach-
es to reconcile and resolve disputes between the parties in con-
flict.81 However, the agreement between parties must comply
with the African Charter’s provisions rather than violate the
rights guaranteed by these provisions.82
The ACtHPR may also be requested to exercise its conten-
tious jurisdiction. Article 3(1) of the Protocol provides that the
ACtHPR jurisdiction shall extend to all cases and disputes
submitted to it concerning the interpretation and application of
the Charter, this Protocol, and any other relevant Human
Rights instrument ratified by the concerned States.83 This
means, in performing its contentious jurisdiction, the ACtHPR
has a dual function, consisting of either interpreting or apply-
ing the provisions of the African Charter and other relevant
human rights instruments.84
Although this dual contentious function can be cumulatively
performed, ACtHPR—to the extent that it can adjudicate
whether or not the respondent State has efficiently applied a
78. Id. art. 4.
79. Id.
80. Id. art. 9.
81. FIDH, supra note 16, at 52.
82. Protocol to the African Charter, supra note 3, art. 9.
83. Id. art. 3, para. 1.
84. FIDH, supra note 16, at 51.
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right guaranteed by the provisions of the African Charter—
may also interpret some of these provisions.85 For instance, in
Norbert Zongo and others v. Burkina Faso, a case pertaining to
the assassination of the journalist Norbert Zongo, the ACtHPR
interpreted the provisions of the African Charter pertaining to
the exhaustion of local remedies and ruled that Burkina Faso
had failed to take appropriate action to “ensure that the rights
of the Applicants for their cause to be heard by competent na-
tional Courts are respected.”86 The ECtHR and the IACtHR
have also recognized a dual contentious function to interpret
and apply human rights provisions.87
b. Standing Rights
According to Article 5 of the Protocol to the African Charter
and Rule 33 of the Rules of ACtHPR, the ability to approach
the ACtHPR is only held by: the African Commission, State
parties to the Protocol, African Intergovernmental Organiza-
tions, and exceptional NGOs and individuals from States ac-
cepting the Court’s jurisdiction. In other words, NGOs and in-
dividuals are denied the right to directly lodge complaints be-
fore the ACtHPR.88 Instead, they must indirectly approach the
Court by instituting complaints before the African Commission,
hoping the latter will forward the matter to the Court. Howev-
er, there is no absolute guarantee that in seizing the African
Commission, the case will subsequently be referred to the
85. Id.
86. Norbert Zongo, Abdoulaye Nikiema alias Ablasse, Ernest Zongo and
Blaise Ilboudo and The Burkinabe Human and People’s Rights Movement v.
Burkina Faso, Case No. 013/2011, Decision, African Court on Human and
Peoples’ Rights [Afr. Ct. H.P.R.], ¶ 125 (June 21, 2013),
http://dev.ihrda.org/fr/doc/013.11/view/; see also African Court on Human and
People’s Rights Issues Judgment in Killing of Investigative Journalist, INT’L
JUST. RESOURCE CTR. (Apr. 8, 2014),
http://www.ijrcenter.org/2014/04/08/african-court-on-human-and-peoples-
rights-issues-judgment-in-killing-of-investigative-journalist/.
87. European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
art. 32, para. 1, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter European Con-
vention]; see also American Convention on Human Rights, art. 62, para. 3,
Nov. 22, 1969, 9 I.L.M. 101 [hereinafter American Convention].
88. Protocol to the African Charter, supra note 3, art. 5, para. 3 & art. 34
para. 6; see also AFR. COURT OF HUMAN & PEOPLES’ RIGHTS, RULES OF COURT,
r. 33, para. 1 (2010), http://en.african-
court.org/images/Basic%20Documents/Final_Rules_of_Court_for_Publication_
after_Harmonization_-_Final__English_7_sept_1_.pdf.
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Court. The African Commission may try to adjudicate the mat-
ter itself and make recommendations to the respondent State.
The Commission may refer the case to the Court only when the
respondent State fails to comply with the African Commission’s
recommendations. This process could take many years before
the ACtHPR is actually able to hear the case. However, NGOs
and individuals from States that have made a declaration ac-
cepting the jurisdiction of the Court for its citizens, can bring
cases directly before the ACtHPR. As of March 2015, only five
countries have made such a declaration authorizing their citi-
zens to directly approach the Court, including Burkina Faso,
Ghana, Malawi, Mali, and Tanzania.89 It is worth noting that
the ACtHPR is not the only international judicial human rights
body that bars individuals from directly approaching the Court.
Individuals and NGOs also lack standing to directly institute
complaints before the IACtHR; they are required to lodge com-
plaints through the Inter-American Commission of Human
Rights.90 However, unlike the African and IACtHR, the ECtHR
is the only international judicial human rights body that auto-
matically accepts complaints coming directly from individu-
als.91
c. Admissibility
According to the Protocol to the African Charter, the ACtHPR
should rule on the admissibility of cases based on Article 56 of
the African Charter.92 The Protocol also emphasizes that the
ACtHPR may request the opinion of the African Commission
when deciding on the admissibility of complaints.93 These inter-
judicial interactions reflect the unique relationship between
the ACtHPR and the African Commission.
d. Relationship Between the ACtHPR and the African Commis-
sion
Article 2 of the Protocol to the African Charter provides that
“the Court shall . . . complement the protective mandate of the
89. The African Court on Human and People’s Rights, AFR. UNION,
http://www.au.int/en/organs/cj (last visited Oct. 21, 2015).
90. American Convention, supra note 87, art. 44.
91. European Convention, supra note 87, art. 34.
92. Protocol to the African Charter, supra note 3, art. 6, para. 2.
93. Id. art. 6, para. 1.
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African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights . . . con-
ferred upon it by the African Charter on Human and Peoples’
Rights.”94 The complementary relationship between the AC-
tHPR and the African Commission is demonstrated through
the collaboration on the issue of locus standi, where the African
Commission serves as the road leading to the Court, particular-
ly in the context when offending States do not allow their citi-
zens to directly approach the Court. Their collaboration is also
reflected in the Court’s advisory jurisdiction where it can re-
quest the advisory opinion of the African Commission on hu-
man rights questions.95 Furthermore, both the ACtHPR and
the African Commission work together on the admissibility of
cases where the ACtHPR demands the African Commission’s
opinion96 or decides not to adjudicate the complaints brought
before it and transfers them to the African Commission for ex-
amination.97
In conclusion, unlike the African Commission, the procedure
before the ACtHPR is judicial, and the decisions rendered by
the Court are legally binding for the offending States. And, ac-
cording to Article 30 of the Protocol, the State Parties are re-
quired to comply with the Court’s judgment.
3. ACJHR
It may be unclear why there is an ACJHR when the ACtHPR
just entered into force in 2004. One may wonder what is wrong
with the newly born ACtHPR that necessitates its replacement
by a new Court. Before exploring these concerns, it is impera-
tive to illustrate the context of the creation of the ACJHR.
In July 2002, the OAU was disbanded and replaced by the
AU, which was entitled with the mission of achieving “an inte-
grated, prosperous and peaceful Africa, driven by its own citi-
zens and representing a dynamic force in [the] global arena.”98
The AU was established on the basis of a Constitutive Act of
2000,99 with a Court of Justice as its judicial organ.100 The
94. Id. art. 2.
95. Id. art. 4.
96. Id. art. 6, para. 1.
97. Id. art. 6, para. 3.
98. AU in a Nutshell, AFR. UNION, http://au.int/en/about/nutshell (last vis-
ited Apr. 13, 2015).
99. Org. of African Unity, Constitutive Act of the African Union, July 11,
2000, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/23.15 [hereinafter AU Constitutive Act].
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Court of Justice was set to be a separate and distinct Court
from the ACtHPR mandated to adjudicate the compliance of
the AU’s State members with the AU’s treaties and deci-
sions.101 Both the Court of Justice and the ACtHPR had juris-
diction to hear human rights complaints—the former had ju-
risdiction on human rights cases based on the AU Constitutive
Act, and the latter had jurisdiction based on the Protocol to the
African Charter.102 It soon became obvious that the coexistence
of multiple regional courts with overlapping jurisdictions could
lead to a serious risk of conflicting jurisprudence, as the same
rules of law might be interpreted differently in different cas-
es.103 In addition to the potential legal problem, there were also
some practical concerns that maintaining two continental
Courts would be challenging due to both insufficient human
and financial resources. From this quagmire, there emerged
the idea of merging the two Courts into a single Court.104 In
July 2008, the AU’s State members adopted a Protocol105 that
merged the Court of Justice and the ACtHPR into a single
Court called the ACJHR. Article 60 of the ACJHR Protocol pro-
vides that the Protocol and its Court’s Statute will enter into
force thirty days after the ratification of the Protocol by fifteen
member States.106 As of December 2014, only five states—
Libya, Mali, Burkina Faso, Congo-Brazzaville, and Benin—had
ratified the ACJHR Protocol.107 Beyond the legal and practical
challenges which occasioned the creation of a single and more
powerful Court in Africa, another motivation for establishing
100. Id. art. 5, para. 1(d), art. 18.
101. FIDH, supra note 16, at 141.
102. FIDH, supra note 16, at 142.
103. See Nsongurua J. Udombana, Toward the African Court on Human
and Peoples’ Rights: Better Late Than Never, 3 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J.
45, 102 (2000).See generally Marc Schulman, Note, The African Court of Jus-
tice and Human Rights: A Beacon of Hope or a Dead-end Odyssey?, INKULKDA
STUDENT J.L. U. WITWATERSRAND, 2013,
http://www.inkundlajournal.org/inkundla/2013-inkundla-2.
104. Id.
105. Protocol on the Statute of the ACJHR, supra note 4.
106. Id. art. 60.
107. List of Countries Which Have Signed, Ratified/Acceded to the Protocol
on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights, AFR. UNION
(Mar. 2, 2014),
http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/Protocol%20on%20Statute%20of%20th
e%20African%20Court%20of%20Justice%20and%20HR_0.pdf.
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such a Court seemed to be purely political. Indeed, according to
numerous African leaders, it is important to create a continen-
tal criminal judicial institution to provide African solutions to
African problems rather than having the ICC preoccupied with
trying to solve African challenges by using Western standards,
perceptions, and perspectives.108 In other words, some African
Heads of States (even if unfairly) perceive the ICC, whose com-
petence consists of judging international crimes, as a judicial
institution that principally targets African people (including
political leaders) accused of perpetrating international crimes,
such as crimes against humanity, genocide, war crimes, and
crimes of aggression.109 In response, for example, the AU
adopted a resolution preventing its members from cooperating
with the ICC in the arrest and transfer110 of Omar Al-Bechir,
President of Sudan111 to the ICC.
108. Murigi Macharia, The Establishment of the African Court of Justice
and Human Rights is Unstoppable, Says President Kenyatta as Kenya Com-
mits Dollars One Million ($1 Million) to the New Judicial Institution,
PRESIDENT.GO.KE (Jan. 31, 2015),
http://web.archive.org/web/20150405175158/http://www.president.go.ke/the-
establishment-of-the-african-court-of-justice-and-human-rights-is-
unstoppable-says-president-kenyatta-as-kenya-commits-dollars-one-million-
1-million-to-the-new-judicial-institution/.
109. Since the establishment of the ICC, all twenty-two cases brought be-
fore it concern the nationals of the African countries. Some of these cases
were referred to the ICC by States parties to the Rome Statute, such as
Uganda, the DRC, the Central African Republic, and Mali. Others were re-
ferred to the ICC by the Security Council regarding the situation in Sudan,
and the situation in Libya, which are both non-States parties to the Rome
Statute. And some others cases were initiated proprio motu by the ICC itself
(concerning particularly the situations in Kenya and Ivory Coast). See Situa-
tions and Cases, INT’L CRIM. CT., http://www.icc-
cpi.int/en_menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/Pages/situations%20and%20
cases.aspx (last visited Apr. 14, 2015).
110. Katherine Iliopoulos, The African Union and the ICC, CRIMES OF WAR,
http://www.crimesofwar.org/commentary/the-african-union-and-the-icc/ (last
visited Apr.14, 2015).
111. Prosecutor v. Bashir, Case ICC-02/05-01/09, Warrant of Arrest (Mar. 9,
2009), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc535163.pdf. Omar Al-Bashir is
being prosecuted for war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity in
connection with situations occurring in Darfur from 2003 to 2008.
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a. Jurisdictions of the ACJHR
The ACJHR has competence ratione materiae of the ACtHPR,
the Court of Justice, and the international criminal tribunal.112
In other words, as a contentious jurisdiction, the ACJHR is not
only empowered to adjudicate the compliance of its States
members with both the human rights provisions (based on the
African Charter) and the AU’s Constitutive Act and treaties,
but also to judge the State-members’ citizens based on interna-
tional human rights instruments.113 Accordingly, the Draft Pro-
tocol amending the Protocol on the Statute of the ACJHR pro-
vides that the ACJHR is divided into three Sections: a General
Affairs Section, a Human Rights Section, and an International
Criminal Law Section.114 The General Affairs Section is compe-
tent to adjudicate all cases, except those “concerning human
and/or peoples’ rights issues,” which are saved for the Human
Rights Section; the International Criminal Law Section is com-
petent to hear cases relating to international crimes.115 Each
112. Olufemi Elias, Introductory Note to Protocol on the Statute of the
ACJHR, supra note 4, at 314.
113. Article 28 of the Protocol on the Statute of the ACJHR provides:
The Court shall have jurisdiction over all cases and all legal disputes
submitted to it in accordance with the present Statute which relate
to: a) The interpretation and application of the Constitutive Act; b)
The interpretation, application or validity of other Union Treaties
and all subsidiary legal instruments adopted within the framework
of the Union or the Organization of African Unity; c) The interpreta-
tion and the application of the African Charter, the Charter on the
Rights and Welfare of the Child, the Protocol to the African Charter
on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa, or
any other legal instrument relating to human rights, ratified by the
States Parties concerned; d) Any question of international law; e) All
acts, decisions, regulations and directives of the organs of the Union;
f) All matters specifically provided for in any other agreements that
States Parties may conclude among themselves, or with the Union
and which confer jurisdiction on the Court; g) The existence of any
fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of an obligation
owed to a State Party or to the Union; h) The nature or extent of the
reparation to be made for the breach of an international obligation.
Protocol on the Statute of the ACJHR, supra note 4, art. 28.
114. Draft Protocol Amending ACJHR Protocol, supra note 4, annex art. 6,
para. 1, at 8 (amending art. 16) (“The Court shall have three Sections: a Gen-
eral Affairs Section, a Human Rights Section, and an International Criminal
Law Section.”).
115. Id. annex art. 7, para. 1, at 9 (amending art. 17).
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Section of the ACJHR has its own appointed judges116 and may
refer a case brought before it to the Full Court (all sections re-
unified) for consideration, if necessary.117 Important to note is
that the establishment of a permanent, regional, and criminal
judicial body in Africa is revolutionary within the African jus-
tice system, even if the primordial intention of this innovation
might have been to avoid the humiliation of seeing African po-
litical leaders being prosecuted before the ICC. An abrupt rup-
ture with the ICC by African countries would have been per-
ceived as a consecration of impunity for international crimes
due to the vacuum that would have been generated for prose-
cuting international crimes in Africa. The ACJHR’s Interna-
tional Criminal Law Section (with its three Chambers: the Pre-
Trial, the Trial, and the Appellate Chambers118) was therefore
established to fill the eventual gaps. Another innovation relates
to the impressive list of international crimes that the ACJHR’s
International Criminal Law Section is competent to adjudicate.
Unlike the ICC, which only tries cases of genocide, crimes
against humanity, war crimes, and crimes of aggression, the
International Criminal Law Section may additionally judge
cases of an unconstitutional change of government, piracy, ter-
rorism, mercenarism, corruption, money laundering, trafficking
in persons, trafficking in drugs, trafficking in hazardous
wastes, and illicit exploitation of natural resources.119 In other
words, the International Criminal Law Section “has jurisdic-
tion over many crimes, of which some are not yet fixed in the
international criminal firmament, such as unconstitutional
change of government or illicit exploitation of natural re-
sources.”120 In light of this extended jurisdiction, a more practi-
cal question that can also be asked is: Will the ACJHR have a
consequent budget and staff to properly perform the criminal
law function in addition to human rights and other func-
tions?121 This question does not require an immediate answer,
116. Id. annex art. 6, para. 3, at 8 (amending art. 6).
117. Id. annex arts. 8 & 9, at 9 (amending arts. 18, 19).
118. Id. annex art. 6, para. 2, at 8 (amending art. 16).
119. Id. annex art. 14, para. 1, at 13 (amending art. 28A).
120. Max Du Plessis, Implication of the AU Decision to Give the African
Court Jurisdiction over International Crimes, INST. FOR SECURITY STUD., June
2012, at 7, www.issafrica.org/uploads/Paper235-AfricaCourt.pdf.
121. Id. at 5.
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given that the Court itself is neither operational nor has its
budget been voted.
Even though the Court is not yet officially operational, the
ACJHR can issue advisory opinions over legal questions re-
quested by the AU’s organs, including the Assembly, the Par-
liament, the Executive Council, the Peace and Security Coun-
cil, the Economic, Social and Cultural Council, and the finan-
cial institutions (e.g., the African Investment Bank, the African
Monetary Fund, and the African Central Bank).122 The request
for an advisory opinion must clearly mention the subject mat-
ter and must not be related to a pending application before the
African Commission or the African Committee of Experts.123
This condition intends to limit situations of “jurisdictional over-
lap and to prevent cases where contentious complaints might
be disguised and submitted as advisory opinions.”124
Finally, in terms of the competence ratione personae, the
ACJHR has jurisdiction over both juristic and natural persons.
The ACJHR is empowered to try juristic persons, particularly
State members for: their human rights violations committed
against their own populations or other States’ populations and
their noncompliance with the AU’s Constitutive Act and trea-
ties.125 The ACJHR can also adjudicate cases concerning non-
State juristic persons, such as corporations, for their complicity
or participation in the commission of international crimes.126 In
addition to juristic persons, the ACJHR can judge natural per-
sons for their involvement in committing international crimes.
These natural persons may include the Heads of States or gov-
ernments, government ministers or officials, chiefs of armies,
and leaders or members of rebel groups for their individual
participation in the violation of international human rights in-
struments.127 The dual competence ratione personae of the
ACJHR is very innovative for an international or regional judi-
122. Protocol on the Statute of the ACJHR, supra note 4, art. 53, para. 1.
123. Id.
124. Dan Juma, Lost (or Found) in Transition? The Anatomy of the New
African Court of Justice and Human Rights, 13 Y.B. U.N. L. (Max Planck
Inst.) 267, 300 (2009), www.mpil.de/files/pdf2/mpunyb_08_jumaii.pdf.
125. Protocol on the Statute of the ACJHR, supra note 4, art. 28, para. 1.
126. Draft Protocol Amending the ACJHR Protocol, supra note 4, annex art.
22, at 31 (amending art. 46C).
127. Mbori Otieno, The Merged African Court of Justice and Human Rights
(ACJ&HR) as a Better Criminal Justice System than the ICC, at 6 (June 3,
2014) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2445344.
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cial body. Most international judicial bodies are competent to
try the misconduct of either States or individuals, not both. For
instance, the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the ECtHR,
the IACtHR, and the ACtHR are only competent to hear cases
relating to the misconduct of States against international hu-
man rights instruments and/or international law. Whereas, the
ICC and the International Tribunals for ex-Yugoslavia and
Rwanda are solely competent over individuals’ misconduct
against international human rights laws.
b. Applicable Laws and Standing
In carrying out its functions, the ACJHR is obligated to apply
the AU’s Constitutive Act, the African Charter, other relevant
regional human rights instruments, the international treaties
ratified by the concerned States, and the international customs
and general principles of law. Entities eligible to submit cases
to the ACJHR consist of: (1) State Parties; (2) the AU’s Organs
(including the Assembly, Parliament, Peace and Security
Council, and other AU institutions); (3) AU-staff members on
dispute appeals based on the Staff Rules and Regulations of the
Union; (4) the Office of the Prosecutor of the ACJHR; (5) the
African Commission; (6) the African Committee of Experts on
the Rights and Welfare of the Child; (7) African Intergovern-
mental Organizations; (8) African NHRIs; and (9)
NGOs/individuals from exceptional States accepting the
Court’s jurisdiction.128 Like the ACtHPR, the ACJHR is not
open to nonmembers of the AU or AU-State members that have
not ratified the Protocol of the Court.129 Two additional obser-
vations can be made about the entities eligible to approach the
Court. First, there is a recognition of locus standi for two new
entities, namely the African Committee of Experts on the
Rights and Welfare of the Child, and the African NHRIs, which
are the domestic human rights institutions established by
States to promote and protect human rights at the national
level.130 Second, NGOs and individuals are once again denied
the possibility to directly institute complaints before the
128. Protocol on the Statute of the ACJHR, supra note 4, arts. 29, 30.
129. Id. art. 29, para. 2.
130. Resolution on Granting Observer [or “Affilliate”] Status to National
Human Rights Institutions in Africa, U. MINN. HUM. RHTS LIBR. (1998),
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/africa/res-observer.html.
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ACJHR, but they can indirectly lodge complaints to the Court
through the African Commission. In addition to the African
Commission, NGOs and individuals may currently use their
NHRIs as an alternative channel to reach the Court. However,
this alternative would depend on how the scope of competence
of the NHRIs is defined by the respective authorizing domestic
legislation. The ACJHR can also use its discretion by allowing
some NGOs and individuals to directly seize it, particularly
those residing in States that have formally recognized the ju-
risdiction of the Court in hearing cases from their nationals.
c. Admissibility
The admissibility of cases before the ACJHR depends on the
subject matters of complaints. The rules differ depending on
whether the complaints fall under the jurisdiction of the Gen-
eral Affairs Section, Human Rights Section, or the Internation-
al Criminal Law Section.
In regards to cases handled by the General Affairs Section,
the admissibility of complaints is regulated by Article 33 of the
Protocol on the Statute of the ACJHR.131 To be admissible, the
complaint must indicate the subject of the dispute, the applica-
ble law for the dispute, and the jurisdiction competent to hear
the case.132 Once the complaint is lodged, the Registrar will in-
form the State concerned by the complaint or dispute, all
States members, and, if necessary, the organs of the Union
whose decisions are in dispute.133 Each party concerned by the
dispute will have the possibility to intervene and make com-
ments on the complaints.134
Article 34 of the Protocol on the Statute of the ACJHR deal-
ing with the proceedings before the Human Rights Section is
laconic on the rules regulating the admissibility of complaints
lodged before this Human Rights Section.135 The provisions of
131. Protocol on the Statute of the ACJHR, supra note 4, art. 33.
132. Id. art. 33, para. 1.
133. Id. art. 33, para. 3.
134. Id. arts. 50, 51.
135. The Protocol on the Statute of the ACJHR provides:
Cases brought before the Court relating to an alleged violation of a
human or peoples’ right shall be submitted by a written application
to the Registrar. The application shall indicate the right[](s) alleged
to have been violated, and, insofar as it is possible, the provision or
provisions of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, the
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the Protocol on the Statute of the ACJHR is ambiguous on the
question as to what criteria needs to be met in order for a com-
plaint to be admissible before the ACJHR’s Human Rights Sec-
tion. In light of these provisions, it appears that the complaint
before the Human Rights Section should only mention the vio-
lated right(s) and the illegality of this act(s) vis-à-vis the hu-
man rights instruments ratified by the concerned State.136 But,
one may also wonder whether the complaint would not be de-
clared inadmissible by the ACJHR’s Human Rights Section if it
is filed anonymously or at an unreasonable time or before ex-
hausting local remedies.
Nevertheless, concerning the complaints under the jurisdic-
tion of the International Criminal Law Section, the rule of ad-
missibility of cases is set up by Article 46E, 46E bis, and 46F of
the Draft Protocol amending the ACJHR Protocol.137 These
provisions established some preconditions for a case to be de-
clared admissible. A State party willing to seize the Interna-
tional Criminal Law Section should have previously accepted
the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Law Section and
agreed that any criminal conduct committed in its territory
and/or by its nationals is to be prosecuted.138 Additionally, the
criminal conduct, which is the subject matter of the complaints,
should have been committed after the entry into force of the
Protocol on the Statute of the ACJHR.139 As of March 2015, the
ACJHR is not yet operational. Acting as a complementary ju-
risdiction to the domestic and subregional courts, the Interna-
tional Criminal Law Section will reject the complaints on cases
that were already adjudicated at the national or regional lev-
el140 by virtue of the principle of no bis in idem.141 Furthermore,
Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, Protocol to the Afri-
can Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women
in Africa or any other relevant human rights instrument, ratified by
the State concerned, on which it is based. 2. The Registrar shall
forthwith give notice of the application to all parties concerned, as
well as the Chairperson of the Commission.
Id. art. 34.
136. Id.
137. Draft Protocol Amending ACJHR Protocol, supra note 4, annex art. 22,
at 31–32 (amending arts. 46E, 46E bis & 46F).
138. Id. at 32 (amending art. 46E bis).
139. Id. (amending art. 46E, para. 1, as amended).
140. Id. at 33 (amending art. 46H, para. 2(c)).
141. Id. at 34 (amending art. 46I)
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the International Criminal Law Section will not hear cases
pending before the national and subregional jurisdictions.142
However, the International Criminal Law Section can declare
admissible a case that is being investigated or prosecuted by
the domestic court, if the State is unwilling or unable to com-
plete the investigation or prosecution.143 To determine the ina-
bility of a State to prosecute or investigate, the International
Criminal Law Section will assess whether the concerned State
was unable, for example, to collect necessary evidence and tes-
timony against the accused person and to try him/her owing to
the collapse or unavailability of its domestic judicial system.144
There is also no statute of limitations for crimes under the
competence of the International Criminal Law Section, which
means that the eligible entity can approach the International
Criminal Law Section any time after the international criminal
conduct was committed. However, there are time limitations
for applications for the revision of a judgment: they are re-
quired to be filed no more than six months after the discovery
of new facts or within ten years from the date of the judg-
ment.145
It should be noted that these prerequisites for approaching
the International Criminal Law Section are not an innovation
introduced by the ACJHR’s Protocol; other international judi-
cial bodies, such as the ICC, impose similar requirements.146
Like in the ICC, the official position of the accused person can-
not provide judicial relief from prosecution or mitigate punish-
ment before the International Criminal Law Section.147 Unlike
the ICC, no prosecutions or investigations can be initiated or
continued against the AU’s sitting Heads of State or Govern-
ment, or senior government officials.148 This immunity clause
for the serving governmental leaders was recently introduced
to the ACJHR’s Protocol to prevent African leaders from being
criminally held accountable for their commission of interna-
142. Id. at 33 (amending art. 46H, para. 1).
143. Id. (amending art. 46H, paras. 2(a), (b)).
144. Id. at 34 (amending art. 46H, para. 4).
145. Protocol on the Statute of the ACJHR, art. 48,
http://www.refworld.org/docid/4937f0ac2.html (last visited Nov. 24, 2015).
146. Rome Statute, supra note 5, art. 17.
147. Draft Protocol Amending ACJHR Protocol, supra note 4, annex art. 22,
at 32 (amending art. 46B, para. 2).
148. Id. annex art. 22, art. 46A bis.
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tional crimes while in office. As of March 2015, Omar al-Bechir
(President of Sudan),149 Uhuru Kenyatta (President of Ken-
ya),150 and William Ruto (Deputy-President of Kenya)151 are
facing criminal charges before the ICC. Some may argue that
the criminal immunity of sitting government officials is con-
sistent with international law, which recognizes diplomatic
immunity for diplomatic officers.152 This statement is partially
valid. Of course, diplomats enjoy diplomatic immunity while
exercising their functions; but an ICJ’s ruling has limited the
scope of that immunity for certain violations of international
149. Prosecutor v. Bashir, Case ICC-02/05-01/09, Warrant of Arrest (March
9, 2009), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc535163.pdf.
150. Prosecutor v. Kenyatta, ICC-01/09-02/11, Decision of Judge Trenda-
filova, at 3 (Mar. 8, 2011). Since January 2012, Mr. Kenyatta was facing
charges of crimes against humanity before the ICC in connection with the
postelection violence in Kenya in 2007–2008. However, in March 2015, the
ICC’s Trial Chamber issued a decision withdrawing all charges against him
due to lack sufficient evidence. Prosecutor v. Kenyatta, ICC-01/09-02/11, De-
cision of Judge Ozaki, ¶ 12 (Mar. 13, 2015).
151. Prosecutor v. Ruto. ICC-01/09-01/11, Decision of Judge Trendafilova, at
3 (Mar. 8, 2011).
152. Under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations: “The person of
a diplomatic agent shall be inviolable. He shall not be liable to any form of
arrest or detention. The receiving State shall treat him with due respect and
shall take all appropriate steps to prevent any attack on his person, freedom
or dignity.”Moreover,
[first, a] diplomatic agent shall enjoy immunity from the criminal ju-
risdiction of the receiving State. He shall also enjoy immunity from
its civil and administrative jurisdiction, except in the case of: (a) A
real action relating to private immovable property situated in the
territory of the receiving State, unless he holds it on behalf of the
sending State for the purposes of the mission; (b) An action relating
to succession in which the diplomatic agent is involved as executor,
administrator, heir or legatee as a private person and not on behalf
of the sending State; (c) An action relating to any professional or
commercial activity exercised by the diplomatic agent in the receiv-
ing State outside his official functions. [Second, a] diplomatic agent
is not obliged to give evidence as a witness. [Third, no] measures of
execution may be taken in respect of a diplomatic agent except in the
cases coming under subparagraphs (a), (b) and (c) of paragraph 1 of
this article, and provided that the measures concerned can be taken
without infringing the inviolability of his person or of his residence.
[Finally, t]he immunity of a diplomatic agent from the jurisdiction of
the receiving State does not exempt him from the jurisdiction of the
sending State.
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law. Indeed, in Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) v. Bel-
gium, which concerned an arrest warrant against the DRC’s
Foreign Minister, the ICJ held that: “[t]he official capacity of a
person, whether under national or international law, shall not
bar the Court from exercising its jurisdiction over such a per-
son.”153 In other words, the ICJ wanted to convey that diplo-
matic immunity might not be operational in the case of a dip-
lomat committing an international crime. In light of this rul-
ing, the immunity clause within the ACJHR’s Protocol, which
enables sitting African government officials to avoid prosecu-
tion, appears to be retrogressive in terms of everyone’s equality
before the law.154
d. Relationship Between the ACJHR, ACtHPR, and African
Commission
The rapport between the ACJHR, ACtHPR, and African
Commission is governed by the principle of complementarity.
The Protocol on the Statute of ACJHR provides that, in order
to achieve the objectives of the African Charter, the ACJHR is
established to supplement and strengthen the mission of the
African Commission and the African Committee of Experts on
the Rights and Welfare of the Child.155 Article 38 of the same
Protocol also emphasizes that the Rules of Procedures before
the ACJHR should take into account the complementarity be-
tween the Court and other treaty bodies of the AU.156 In re-
gards to collaboration between the ACJHR and the ACtHPR,
all cases pending before the latter that predate the entry into
force of the Protocol on the Statute of ACJHR will be trans-
ferred to the ACJHR’s Human Rights Section.157 The same
principle should also apply to unadjudicated cases pending be-
fore the ACtHPR while the ACJHR awaits full operational sta-
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, arts. 29, 31, Apr. 18, 1961, 500
U.N.T.S. 90.
153. Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Con-
go v. Belg.), Judgment, 2002 I.C.J. 3, ¶ 56 (Feb. 14).
154. Statement Regarding Immunity for Sitting Officials Before the Ex-
panded African Court of Justice and Human Rights, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Apr.
12, 2015), http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/11/13/statement-regarding-
immunity-sitting-officials-expanded-african-court-justice-and-hu.
155. Protocol on the Statute of the ACJHR, supra note 4, pmbl.
156. Id. art. 38.
157. Id. art. 5.
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tus.158 Furthermore, the ACJHR also cooperates with the Afri-
can Commission and the NHRIs on the issue of locus standi
since these institutions can approach the ACJHR on behalf of
NGOs and individuals that lack the opportunity to directly
seize the Court.159
Similar to the procedure in the ACtHPR, the procedure be-
fore the ACJHR is judicial, and its judgments produce binding
effects on all parties who have initially accepted the Court’s
jurisdiction. According to Article 43(6) of the Protocol on the
Statute of the ACJHR, all State Parties should comply with the
Court’s judgments, and the AU’s Executive Council should
monitor the execution of the ACJHR’s judgments by the con-
cerned States.160 However, the relevant question is, how com-
pliant are African States with the decisions of the African hu-
man rights bodies? This question will be answered in the up-
coming Part, which deals with compliance, or noncompliance,
with human rights courts’ decisions in Africa.
II. (NON)COMPLIANCE WITHHUMAN RIGHTS COURTDECISIONS
IN AFRICA
State parties to treaties, having recognized the jurisdiction of
international or regional judicial bodies, are called to comply
with decisions rendered by these bodies. This section will ex-
plore the concept of compliance and the challenges for the en-
forcement of international decisions. It will also formulate
some recommendations on how to increase the rate of enforce-
ment of international judgments.
A. Understanding the Concept of Compliance
There is no single definition articulating the concept of “com-
pliance.” Numerous scholars have suggested definitions to de-
scribe what constitutes compliance with (inter)national deci-
sions. In light of Article 94(2) of the U.N. Charter, noncompli-
ance is the failure by a State party to perform the obligations
incumbent upon it under a judgment delivered by the ICJ.161
According to Heather Jones, noncompliance is a defiance in-
volving an indiscriminate dismissal of a court judgment as in-
158. Id.
159. Id. arts. 29, 30.
160. Id. art. 43, para. 6.
161. U.N. Charter art. 94, ¶ 2.
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valid, coupled with a refusal to obey it.162 For Jana Von Stein163
and Kal Raustiala,164 compliance is the scale to which the be-
havior of a State conforms to a legal standard. This raises the
question of distinguishing compliance from effectiveness, which
is the degree to which the legal rules impact a State’s behav-
ior.165 However, it is not uncommon for a State party to a Con-
vention to fully obey with the provisions of the Convention
based on their motivations that are not really related to the
Convention itself.166
Most international and regional Conventions consecrate the
State’s obligation of compliance with international courts’ deci-
sions. According to the U.N. Charter, each State member
should undertake to comply with the judgment of the ICJ.167
Similar stipulations have been replicated by the European,168
Inter-American,169 and African treaties on Human Rights.170
This obligation of compliance cannot be understood as recipro-
cal; each State party to the dispute is principally responsible
for opting for a method in which the court’s decision would be
implemented.171 In the context of the ICJ’s decisions, the
State’s choice on its implementation method should not obli-
gate the other party of the dispute who may contest it, which in
turn could lead to another dispute between the concerned par-
ties.172
162. Heather Jones, Why Comply? An Analysis of Trends in Compliance
with Judgments of the International Court of Justice since Nicaragua, 12
CHI.-KENT J. INT’L&COMP. L. 58, 59 (2011).
163. Jana Von Stein, International Law: Understanding Compliance and
Enforcement, in INTERNATIONAL STUDIES ENCYCLOPEDIA 2 (Robert A.
Denemark ed., 2010), available at
www.personal.umich.edu/~janavs/vonstein-compendium.pdf.
164. Kal Raustiala, Compliance and Effectiveness in International Regula-
tory Cooperation, 32 CASEWESTERN. RES. J. INT’L L. 387, 387 (2000).
165. Id.; see also Hawkins & Jacoby, supra note 9, at 39.
166. Heath Pickering, Why Do States Mostly Obey International Law?, E-
INT’L REL. STUDENTS (Feb. 4, 2014), http://www.e-ir.info/2014/02/04/why-do-
states-mostly-obey-international-law/.
167. U.N. Charter art. 94, ¶ 1.
168. European Convention, supra note 87, art. 46, para. 1.
169. American Convention, supra note 87, art. 68, para. 1.
170. Protocol to the African Charter, supra note 3, at art. 30.
171. CONSTANZE SCHULTE, COMPLIANCE WITH DECISIONS OF THE
INTERNATIONAL COURTOF JUSTICE 30 (2004).
172. Id. at 29.
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Nevertheless, researchers catalogue three major categories of
compliance, namely: noncompliance, partial compliance, and
full compliance.173 Indeed, the distinction between these three
levels of compliance is illustrated through the following hypo-
thetical example: Assume that a State X was condemned in
2010 and ordered by the Court to pay financial reparations to a
victim of human rights abuses, to prosecute the perpetrators of
the violations, and to reform domestic legislation on the protec-
tion of victims. In this hypothetical, there is noncompliance if
State X does not execute any of the Court’s remedial orders by
2015. If State X had paid the financial reparations and re-
formed its domestic legislation by 2015, but failed to prosecute
the human rights violators, then there would be partial com-
pliance. In contrast, there would be full compliance if the con-
cerned State executed all components of the Court’s order by
2015. From this hypothetical example, it is plausible that in
the case on Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo
(Democratic Republic of Congo v. Uganda), Uganda has only
partially complied with the ICJ’s judgment on the dispute. In
2005, ICJ ordered Uganda to cease its military activities in the
DRC, to get involved in the peace process, and to make finan-
cial reparations to the Congolese victims of human rights viola-
tions.174 As of March 2015, Uganda has not made financial
payments to the victims.175
Despite the binding effects of the decisions of international
judicial bodies (such as the ICJ, the ICC, the ECtHR, the IAC-
tHR, and the ACtHPR), numerous States have still not fulfilled
their compliance obligations with the Courts’ decisions. Statis-
tics from studies conducted by Hawkins and Jacoby on States’
compliance with human rights bodies decisions reveal that only
6 percent of the IACtHR’s judgments are fully complied with by
concerned States, 83 percent are partially complied, and 11
percent are noncomplied.176 The same studies on States’ com-
pliance with the ECtHR’s decisions by issues disclose the fol-
173. See also Courtney Hillebrecht, Rethinking Compliance: The Challenges
and Prospects of Measuring Compliance with International Human Rights
Tribunals, 1 J. HUM. RTS. 362, 366 (2009).
174. Armed Activities on the Territory of Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Ugan-
da), Judgment 2005 I.C.J. 257 (Dec. 19).
175. KANDOLO, L’Ouganda Refuse d’Indemniser la Rdc!, FORUM DE AS
(Mar. 24, 2015), http://www.forumdesas.org/spip.php?article3733.
176. Hawkins & Jacoby, supra note 9, at 56.
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lowing: only 14 percent of the Court’s verdicts on the right not
to be tortured are enforced by the concerned States; 32 percent
of decisions on protection of rights in detention are executed; 40
percent of decisions against discrimination are complied with;
and 60 percent of decisions on freedom of expression are exe-
cuted.177 Like in Europe and America, the rate of African
States’ compliance with the African Commission’s decisions are
unsatisfactory.178 According to Frans Viljoen and Lirette
Louw’s research, “only 14 percent of State parties comply fully
and in timely fashion with the decisions of the African Com-
mission on Human and Peoples’ Rights.”179
However, the fundamental question posed is: why do States
not comply with the decisions of the international judicial bod-
ies whose competences they have formally recognized? Before
answering this question, it is important to know what might
have led some compliant States to execute the remedial orders
from international Courts. Heather Jones has noted that fac-
tors contributing to compliance include: external political influ-
ence, internal need for a definitive solution, and substance of
the judgment issued.180 First, external political influence con-
sists of pressure from the international community, the in-
volvement of international organizations (such as the U.N. Se-
curity Council empowered to enforce the ICJ’s decisions), and
the fear of developing a bad reputation as a result of noncom-
pliance.181 In regards to reputational costs, some would argue
that this factor might only be pertinent for democratic regimes,
rather than authoritarian regimes whose leaders may be less
concerned about the damage to their country’s reputation re-
177. Id. at 73. Another study by Déborah Forst on the execution of the EC-
tHR’s decisions disclosed that
[a]mong the more than 10,000 cases pending before the Committee
of Ministers for the supervision of the execution 2,278 were leading
cases, i.e. cases which have been identified as revealing a new sys-
temic/general problem in a respondent state, which had been pend-
ing for more than five years. Moreover, 1354 of the 1696 new cases
which became final between 1 January and 31 December 2011, were
repetitive ones.
See Forst, supra note 9, at 1.
178. Viljoen and Louw, supra note 9, at 5.
179. Id.
180. Jones, supra note 162, at 60.
181. Id.
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sulting from noncompliance with human rights standards.182
Second, another factor for compliance with international judg-
ments may be the internal need for a definitive solution. This
means that the conflicting parties may have a shared interest
for the dispute to be settled, or may share a strong economic
and/or cultural relationship, or may have a fear that noncom-
pliance could lead to armed conflict between parties.183 Finally,
the substance of the judgment may also be a variable driving
compliance, particularly if the content of the judgment is un-
ambiguous and nondiscordant with the parties’ self-interests,
or if the decision offers a possibility of compromise and cooper-
ation between parties.184 Of course, ambiguous decisions are
often subject to multiple interpretations from the parties,
which may delay their implementation. However, some unen-
forced international decisions were drafted in clear terms or
were delivered in the context of postarmed conflicts between
disputing States. So, what are the practical and legal challeng-
es for their enforcement?
B. Challenges for International Decision Enforcement
This section will explore from an international human rights
perspective, the practical and legal challenges for the enforce-
ment of international decisions. It will particularly emphasize
the nonenforcement of decisions by African countries.
1. Politicization of the Postadjudicative Phase and Lack of
Sanctions against Defaulting Parties
Offended States traditionally have “used various mechanisms
to enforce international decisions, including international non-
judicial institutions, self-help,185 and diplomatic negotia-
182. Id. at 65.
183. Id. at 68.
184. Id. at 72–75.
185. See Shabtai Rosenne, The International Court of Justice: An Essay in
Political and Legal Theory 92–93 (1957). According to Rosenne,
The doctrine of self-help supplies the theoretical basis for the actions
of the injured judgment creditor, and leaves to that State full liberty
to take measures as it deems necessary to obtain satisfaction of the
judgment in its favour. Self-help resembles to acts of reprisals and/or
retorsion. It may consist of posing acts that illegal in themselves but
legalized or justified by the reference to the antecedent and continu-
ing illegal act of the State against which they are directed (repris-
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tions.”186 For instance, Article 94(2) of the U.N. Charter pro-
vides:
If any party to a case fails to perform the obligations incum-
bent upon it under a judgment rendered by the International
Court of Justice, the other party may have recourse to the Se-
curity Council, which may, if it deems necessary, make rec-
ommendations or decide upon measures to be taken to give ef-
fect to the judgment.
Likewise, according to Article 46(2) of the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights, “The final judgment of the Court shall
be transmitted to the Committee of Ministers, which shall su-
pervise its execution.”187 Similarly, Article 29(2) of the Protocol
to the African Charter and Article 46(4) of the Protocol on the
Statute on the ACJHR respectively state, “The Council of Min-
isters shall also be notified of the judgment and shall monitor
its execution on behalf of the Assembly” and “Where a party
has failed to comply with a judgment, the Court shall refer the
matter to the Assembly, which shall decide upon measures to
be taken to give effect to that judgment.”188
From the above provisions, it appears that the enforcement of
judicial decisions is solely attributed to nonjudicial institutions
rather than judicial institutions. These international instru-
ments are silent about the role of the domestic judicial bodies of
offending States in enforcing international decisions. One
might argue that there is nothing inefficient in securing the
enforcement of international decisions through nonjudicial or-
gans; after all, international courts lack their own police to en-
force their decisions. One might also posit that the attribution
of enforceability of the international courts’ decisions to nonju-
dicial and political organs may be due to the traditional lack of
locus standi of individuals appearing before international judi-
als); or they may consist of acts that are not illegal in themselves,
but merely unfriendly or discourteous (retorsion).
Id.
186. Richard F. Oppong & Lisa C. Niro, Enforcing Judgments of the Inter-
national Courts in National Courts, 5 J. INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT 344, 346
(2014).
187. European Convention, supra note 87, art. 46, para 2.
188. See Protocol to the African Charter, supra note 3, art. 29, para. 2; Pro-
tocol on the Statute on the ACJHR, supra note 4, art. 46, para 4.
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cial bodies.189 These two arguments appear valid. Concerning
the latter argument, individuals have, in fact, traditionally
lacked the ability to approach the international courts. But to-
day, numerous regional human rights courts recognize that in-
dividuals have the right to directly190 or indirectly191 approach
them to seek remedies for their violated human rights. Regard-
ing the former argument, it should be noted that recourse to
nonjudicial mechanisms for international decisions enforce-
ment is not a completely ineffective approach. However, schol-
ars who focused on this subject were concerned about the lack
of efficient success of these practices.192 With regards to the Se-
curity Council’s enforcement competence over ICJ decisions,
the above Article 94(2) of the U.N. Charter provides that, “Se-
curity Council . . . may, if it deems necessary, make recommen-
dations or decide upon measures to be taken to give effect to
the judgment.”193 This wording implies that the Security Coun-
cil has a discretionary power to either enforce or not enforce,
compliance with the ICJ’s decisions no matter whether the re-
quest of compliance was formally made by a State party fa-
vored by the decision.194 This also means that the enforcement
of the ICJ’s decisions is not an “automatic”; instead, it is sub-
jected to “political negotiation” between State political leaders
sitting at the Security Council.195 Therefore in terms of en-
forcement, the role of the ICJ is reduced to that of a “simple
spectator” dependent on political negotiation.196
Additionally, political negotiation at the Security Council lev-
el also raises the issue of voting procedures. According to Arti-
cle 27 of the U.N. Charter, all decisions of the Security Council
must be made by an affirmative vote of nine of its fifteen mem-
189. Oppong & Niro, supra note 186, at 346.
190. See American Convention, supra note 87, art. 44; European Conven-
tion, supra note 91, at art. 34.
191. See African Charter, supra note 2, art. 47; Protocol to the African
Charter, supra note 3, at art.5.
192. Attila Tanzi, Problems of Enforcement of Decisions of the International
Court of Justice and the Law of the United Nations, 6 EUR. J. INT’L L. 539, 540
(1995); see also Pammela Q. Saunders, The Integrated Enforcement of Human
Rights, 45 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 97, 109 (2012); Schulte, supra note 152, at
39.
193. U.N. Charter, art. 94, ¶ 2.
194. Tanzi, supra note 167, at 541–42.
195. Id. at 541.
196. Id.
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bers, which include the concurring votes of the five permanent
members (China, France, Russia, United Kingdom, and the
United States) who have the right to veto.197 This voting proce-
dure creates the risk that, for political rather than legal rea-
sons, the Security Council would not be able to reach a decision
enforcing compliance with an ICJ’s judgment condemning one
of its permanent members. In the Case concerning Military and
Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua between Nic-
aragua and the United States,198 the former approached the
Security Council to get enforcement of the ICJ’s judgment ren-
dered in its favor, after the United States failed to comply.199
The United States, a permanent member of the Security Coun-
cil, argued that the ICJ lacked the jurisdiction or competence to
adjudicate and render decision on the matter.200 The United
States used its veto power, and no decision on enforcing com-
pliance with the ICJ’s judgment was reached by the Security
Council.201 The matter was subsequently submitted for consid-
eration to the U.N. General Assembly, which also lacked com-
petence to deal with a dispute on enforcement of the ICJ’s deci-
sion.202 It should be noted that the U.N. Security Council or
General Assembly is not the only nonjudicial organ where the
difficulty of reaching a decision over the enforcement of and
compliance with judgments from international judicial bodies
can be raised. Similar difficulty can also occur with enforce-
ment decisions of regional human rights judicial bodies, such
197. U.N. Charter, art. 27.
198. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar.
v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14 (June 27).
199. S.C. RES. 18428 (Oct. 28, 1986).
200. U.N. SCOR, 41st Sess., 2718 mtg. at 44–45, U.N. DOC. S/PV.2718 (Oct.
28, 1986). The representative for the United States said:
We cannot sidestep the reality of the situation in central America by
hiding behind a decision of the International Court of Justice, much
less a decision that the Court had neither the jurisdiction nor compe-
tence to render. It does not suffice to clam, as some have done, that
the Court must have had jurisdiction, because Article 36(6) of the
Statute says that the Court may decide disputes concerning that ju-
risdiction.
Id.
201. Id. at 43. (“The United States will vote against the present draft reso-
lution for essentially the same reason that it voted against the previous draft
resolution on the subject in July.”)
202. Tanzi, supra note 167, at 546.
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as the ACtHPR and ACJHR. Provisions of both the Protocol to
the African Charter (Article 29(2)) and the Statute of the
ACJHR (Article 46(4)) also grant the AU’s Council of Ministers
the power to ensure compliance with judgments from the AC-
tHPR or ACJHR. The ACtHPR and ACJHR can seize the
Council of Ministers and request that the Council take a deci-
sion enforcing the Court’s judgment against a defaulting State.
The voting procedure before the AU’s Council of Ministers re-
quires consensus in all decision-making processes; the failure
of which will require decisions to be taken by a two-thirds ma-
jority of its voting members.203 There is no information on a
specific case where the AU’s Council of Ministers decided on
the noncompliance of an AU-State member with the Court’s
judgment. However, it is likely that the AU’s Council of Minis-
ters would be unable to reach the appropriate voting numbers
for a decision to compel an AU-State member to comply with
the Court’s verdict. Still, even if the AU’s Council of Ministers
could reach a positive vote against a noncompliant State, the
Protocol to the African Charter does not prescribe sanctions
against defaulting States. The Protocol on the Statute of the
ACJHR merely provides that the ACJHR should report situa-
tions of States’ noncompliance to the AU Assembly,204 which
may take political and economic sanctions against defaulting
States based on the AU’s Constitutive Act.205 Several notable
observations can be made here. First, the AU Assembly’s adop-
tion of sanctions against noncompliant States is optional even
if there is irrefutable evidence of noncompliance. Second, the
characteristics of political and economic sanctions are ambigu-
ous given that the provisions of the AU Constitutive Act on this
issue are not “eloquent” enough. Third and finally, the ACJHR
is not yet operational; one must wait until its entry into force to
assess the efficiency of the AU Assembly’s actions on noncom-
pliance with the ACJHR’s judgments.
Likewise in Europe, the Committee of Ministers must super-
vise the execution of the ECtHR’s judgments.206 Article 8 of the
Statute of the Council of Europe provides that a member who
fails to comply with the principles of human rights and funda-
203. AU Constitutive Act, supra note 99, art. 11.
204. Protocol on the Statute of the ACJHR, supra note 4, art. 57.
205. AU Constitutive Act, supra note 99, art. 23, para. 2
206. European Convention, supra note 87, art. 46, para. 2.
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mental freedoms, or fails to comply with the realization of
these principles, may be suspended as a member of the Coun-
cil.207 For example, in the Loizidou v. Turkey case,208 the Com-
mittee of Ministers was approached to enforce Turkey’s compli-
ance with the ECtHR decision.209 Despite Turkey’s noncompli-
ance, the Committee of Ministers only threatened to take an
exclusion measure against Turkey without implementing the
measure itself.210 In practice, no State has ever been excluded
from the European Council for noncompliance with an ECtHR
judgment.211
Due to the limitations of nonjudicial bodies to fully ensure
States’ compliance with international decisions, the question
the international community needs to address is why should
nondomestic (quasi) judicial institutions, and particularly those
in Africa, have the power to enforce decisions from internation-
al and regional courts? What are the requirements that would
need to be met in order to empower national (quasi) judicial
institutions in Africa?
2. Lack of Participation by National Judicial Institutions in the
Enforcement of International Judgments
The low rate of enforcement of international judgments may
be partially due to the lack of involvement and/or competence
of the domestic courts in the postjurisdictional stage of interna-
tional proceedings. Empowering domestic courts to have juris-
diction over noncompliance with the judgments of international
courts, would increase the likelihood that the beneficiaries of
international judgments could get them enforced by approach-
ing the municipal courts of the defaulting States and parties.
As Constanze Schulte noted, adjudication before domestic
courts might not only be an “efficient mechanism for the en-
forcement of ICJ decisions,” but also for the implementation of
international law in general.212 Additionally Richard F. Oppong
207. Statute of the Council of Europe, art.8., May 5, 1949, C.E.T.S. 0001.
208. Loizidou v. Turkey, 1996-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 2216.
209. Elisabeth Lambert Abdelgawad, The Execution of the Judgments of the
European Court of Human Rights: Towards a Non-coercive and Participatory
Model of Accountability, 69 ZAÖRV [J. COMP. PUB. L. & INT’L L.] 471, 492
(2009) (Ger.).
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. SCHULTE, supra note 171, at 77.
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has emphasized that the use of domestic courts to enforce deci-
sions of international courts would “enhance individual rights
by depoliticizing the post-adjudicative phase of international
litigation.”213 While there is important potential for the role of
domestic courts in the enforcement of international judg-
ments,214 there is also a concern involving domestic courts in
the determination of the enforcement regime of international
courts’ decisions. In other words: Should domestic courts per-
ceive international judgments as “foreign decisions,” as part of
the national legal system, or otherwise? 215
Indeed, numerous countries worldwide have provisions rec-
ognizing and enforcing decisions rendered by foreign-national
courts under different conditions. For instance, in the Nether-
lands, judgments from foreign-national courts are not enforce-
able in the absence of bilateral treaties.216 In the United States,
decisions from foreign countries’ courts are considered at rela-
tively the same level as domestic judgments; based on the pro-
visions of the Constitution regarding sister-state judgments,217
whose scope is currently extended to cover other foreign na-
tions’ judgments.218 According to the DRC’s Code of Organiza-
tion and Judicial Competence, judgments rendered by foreign
countries’ tribunals are enforceable in the DRC under certain
conditions, including: the compliance of the said judgment with
the DRC public order; the conformity of the judgment with the
local legislation where it was delivered; and the respect of the
defense’s rights.219 Similar to the DRC, the enforcement of for-
213. Oppong, supra note 10, at 121.
214. SCHULTE, supra note 171, at 77.
215. Id.
216. Ralf Michaels, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, in
MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW para. 1, para. 10
(2009), http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-
9780199231690-e1848?rskey=aSSLSe&result=1&prd=EPIL.
217. Judgments delivered by “sister” states of the United States or territo-
ries of the United States are referred as “foreign judgments.” Therefore, the
provisions of the U.S. Constitution compel each state/territory of the United
States to provide “full faith and credit” on sister-state judgments. See U.S.
CONST. art. IV, § 1.
218. Michaels, supra note 216.
219. Ordonnance-Loi 82-020 portant Code de l’Organisation et de la Compé-
tence Judiciares [Code of Organization and Judicial Competence] art. 117
(Dem. Rep. Congo), available at
http://www.leganet.cd/Legislation/Droit%20Judiciaire/OL.31.03.82.n.82.020.h
tm.
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eign judgments is not directly applicable in South Africa.220 The
South African court will enforce a foreign judgment if certain
requirements are met.221
Another question concerning the enforceability of interna-
tional judgments by domestic courts is whether individuals (or
any non-state actors) with interests in the implementation of
decisions from international human rights judicial bodies can
approach the domestic courts of defaulting States for the en-
forcement of judgments delivered in their favor. In Société
Commerciale de Belgique (Socobel) v. Greek State,222 a private
party for whom the Belgian government had exercised diplo-
matic protection, sought to enforce before a Belgian domestic
court a judgment that had been rendered in its favor by the
Permanent Court of International Justice. The Belgian Court
refused to enforce that international decision by ruling that “a
party which, by definition, was not admitted to the bar of an
international court should be able to rely on a decision in a case
to which it was not a party.”223 In Medellin v. Texas, the United
States’ Supreme Court held that an ICJ judgment “is not di-
220. Roger Wakefield, South Africa, in ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN
JUDGMENTS IN 28 JURISDICTIONSWORLDWIDE 108,109 (Mark Moedritzer & Kay
C. Whittaker eds., 2012).
221. Id.; see also Jones v. Krok, 1995 (1) SA 677 (AD) (S. Afr.), available at
http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZASCA/1994/177.pdf (last visited Apr. 14,
2015). In Jones v. Krok, the South African court held that the following condi-
tions must be met prior to enforcing foreign Judgment:
(i) that the court which pronounced the judgment had jurisdiction to
entertain the case according to the principles recognised by our law
with reference to the jurisdiction of foreign courts (sometimes re-
ferred to as “international jurisdiction or competence”); (ii) that the
judgment is final and conclusive in its effect and has not become su-
perannuated; (iii) that the recognition and enforcement of the judg-
ment by our courts would not be contrary to public policy; (iv) that
the judgment was not obtained by fraudulent means; (v) that the
judgment [sic] does not involve the enforcement of a penal or reve-
nue law of the foreign state; and (vi) that enforcement of the judg-
ment is not precluded by the provisions of the Protection of Business
Act 99 of 1978.
Jones v. Krok, 1995 (1) SA 677 (AD) at 14–15 (S. Afr.).
222. Société Commerciale de Belgique (Belg. v. Greece), Judgment, 1939
P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 78 (June 15).
223. See Oppong, supra note 10, at 119. See also SCHULTE, supra note 171,
at 77.
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rectly enforceable as domestic law in the state court.”224 The
U.S. Supreme Court also emphasized that an ICJ judgment
“creates an international law obligation on the part of the
United States, but it is not automatically binding domestic law
because none of the relevant treaty sources creates binding
federal law in the absence of implementing legislation, and no
such legislation has been enacted.”225 This Supreme Court’s po-
sition was not an isolated case, U.S. judges have previously
adopted a similar position on complaints brought before them
on the same issue.226 Similarly, in Africa, some domestic courts
are reluctant to enforce international judgments in their juris-
dictions. For instance in, Republic v. High Court Accra, Ex
parte Attorney General, NML Capital Ltd, and Republic of Ar-
gentina, the Supreme Court of Ghana upheld that
The orders of the International Tribunal of the Law of the Sea
cannot be binding on the Ghanaian courts, in the absence of
the legislation making the orders binding on the Ghanaian
court. In any case, the orders of International Tribunal of the
Law of the Sea given subsequent to the orders and ruling of
the High Court cannot be a valid basis for the grant of certio-
rari, according to the authorities governing the grant of that
remedy in this jurisdiction.227
However, in the DRC, local authorities generally use an “à-la-
carte approach” when it comes to the enforcement of orders
from international courts. For example in Prosecutor v. Thomas
Lubanga, the DRC enforced the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber’s war-
rant of arrest issued against Mr. Lubanga for the war crimes of
enlisting children to participate in armed conflicts.228 The DRC
also complied with the ICC’s orders in the subsequent cases
that involved its two other citizens: Germain Katanga and
Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui.229 However, the Congolese authorities
refused, based on political reasons, to enforce another ICC war-
224. Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 506 (2008).
225. Id. at 522–23.
226. Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 375–76 (1998).
227. Republic v. High Court Accra, Case J5/10/2013, 3 (Sup. Ct. Ghana
2013), http://www.pca-
cpa.org/Supreme%20Court%20Decision9703.pdf?fil_id=2336.
228. Prosecutor v. Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06-2842, Judgment (Mar. 14,
2012).
229. Prosecutor v. Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07-3436, Judgment (Mar. 7,
2014); Prosecutor v. Chui, ICC-01/04-02/12-3, Judgment (Dec. 18, 2012).
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rant of arrest delivered against Bosco Ntaganda for war crimes
and crimes against humanity.230 A similar “à-la-carte ap-
proach” was recently used by the Ivory Coast (Côte d’Ivoire) in
the Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo,231 Prosecutor v. Charles Blé
Goudé, 232 and Prosecutor v. Simone Gbagbo cases,233 which
concerned crimes against humanity committed in the context of
the postelectoral violence in the Ivory Coast.234
Unlike the Socobel, Medellin, Republic, and other cases, the
Constitutional Court of South Africa (CCSA) has recently
adopted an innovative approach to dealing with claims relating
to the enforcement of an international tribunal’s judgment. In-
deed, in Government of the Republic of Zimbabwe v. Louis Ka-
rel Flick,235 the plaintiff approached a South African High
Court to enforce the South African Development Community
(SADC) Tribunal’s order for costs, after unsuccessfully seeking
the enforcement in Zimbabwe of a judgment rendered in his
favor against the Republic of Zimbabwe by a subregional SADC
Tribunal.236 The plaintiff received favorable verdicts before
230. Prosecutor v. Ntaganda, ICC-01/04-02/06-309, Decision Pursuant to
Article 61 of the Rome Statute on the Charges (June 9, 2014). Mr. Bosco Nta-
ganda is a former rebel-chief who became a General in the DRC’s army. In
2006 the ICC issued an arrest warrant against him for war crimes and
crimes against humanity. The DRC authorities have long refused to arrest
him for the sake of peace in the country. However, Mr. Ntaganda was defi-
nitely arrested in Rwanda in 2013 and extradited to the ICC in The Hague
where he is facing trial. See Penny Dale, Profile: Bosco Ntaganda the Congo-
lese ‘Terminator,’ BBC AFR. (Aug. 25, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-
africa-17689131.
231. Prosecutor v. Gbagbo, ICC-02/11-01/11, Concurring Opinion of Judges
Gurmendi and Kaul (June 12, 2014), http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1783399.pdf.
232. Prosecutor v. Blé Goudé, ICC-02/11-02/11, Concurring Opinion of
Judges Gurmendi and Trendafilova (Dec. 12, 2014), http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1879935.pdf.
233. Prosecutor v. Gbago, ICC-02/11-01/12, Warrant of Arrest (Feb. 29,
2012), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1344439.pdf.
234. Like in the DRC, the Ivory Coast enforced the ICC Pre-Trial Cham-
ber’s arrest warrant issued against Laurent Gbagbo and Charles Blé Goudé,
but it refrained from complying with the ICC’s order, which requested the
arrest and extradition of the co-accused, Simone Gbagbo, to the ICC’s head-
quarter in The Hague. See Ivorians Divided over Simone Gbagbo Conviction,
DW.COM, http://www.dw.com/en/ivorians-divided-over-simone-gbagbo-
conviction/a-18305986 (last visited Nov. 24, 2015).
235. Gov’t of the Republic of Zim v. Fick 2013 (CC) (S. Afr.).
236. Id. ¶¶ 2–4.
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both South African’s High Court and Court of Appeals.237 How-
ever, the CCSA was forced to adjudicate whether South African
courts even had jurisdiction over complaints concerning the en-
forcement of the SADC Tribunal (which South Africa recog-
nized the competence of) against Zimbabwe.238 In its ruling, the
CCSA held that the common law on enforcing foreign judg-
ments can also apply to enforce judgments rendered by inter-
national courts and tribunals.239 In other words, the CCSA has
extended the common law on enforcement of foreign judgments
to also cover international courts’ decisions.240 This position of
the CCSA is innovative in the context of the African continent
(or elsewhere in the world), where numerous domestic courts
still opt for the traditional concept of excluding international
judgments from the catalogue of “foreign judgments, thereby
preventing international judgments from being enforced at the
local level.”241
One may wonder if the “revolutionary approach” of the South
African courts will inspire other African countries. This would
neatly resolve all the problems of enforcement of international
judgments by simply considering them “foreign judgments.”
However, is the perception of international judgments as “for-
eign judgments” the proper avenue for the full enforcement of
decisions of international courts? On the one hand, perceiving
international judgments as “foreign judgments” would be a
good approach to increase the likelihood of the enforcement of
those judgments by the national courts of the defaulting States.
However, it is unlikely that all African domestic courts, partic-
ularly those in dualist countries,242 would extend the scope of
their definition of “foreign judgments” to include international
237. Id. ¶ 16, 20.
238. Id. ¶ 54–59.
239. Id.
240. Oppong & Niro, supra note 186, at 357–58.
241. See Republic v. High Court Accra, supra note 227, Case J5/10/2013, 3
(Supreme Court of Ghana 2013); Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 506 (2008);
Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 375–76 (1998); Société Commerciale de Bel-
gique (Belg. v. Greece), supra note 222, 1939 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 78 (June
15).
242. Unlike the monist legal system, in the dualist countries, the interna-
tional treaties duly ratified by the Executive branch of the State do not have
force of law in the domestic legal arsenal unless they have been expressly
given force by the Acts of Parliament.
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judgments without some kind of legal reform. This issue will be
further explored in the upcoming section of this article.
3. “Judicial Sovereignty” of the Domestic Courts vis-à-vis In-
ternational Tribunals?
As previously noted, most domestic courts exclude the deci-
sions of international and regional judicial institutions (such as
the ICJ, ECtHR, ACtHPR, and IACtHR) from their definitions
of “foreign judgments.” This begs the question as to why do-
mestic courts traditionally agree to enforce judgments from
foreign countries (even without the existence of bilateral trea-
ties), and yet at the same time, fail to ensure the execution of
judgments of international courts, even though their States are
bound by treaties that recognize international courts’ jurisdic-
tions. Is the “reluctance” of enforcing international judgments
based on the idea of reaffirming the “judicial sovereign-
ty/autonomy” of the national courts vis-à-vis the supranational
courts, which are perceived as trying to “impose” their deci-
sions on local tribunals? The answer is: possibly. First, the
principle of recognition and enforcement of foreign countries’
decisions at the local level is a relatively new subject.243 This
novel approach of enforcing judgments from foreign nations al-
ters the traditional concept of the (national) territorial compe-
tence of domestic courts, according to which the national courts
should only hear disputes over persons/things (properties) lo-
cated in their national territory, or should adjudicate crimes
committed abroad by their citizens in applying their national
legislation. Second, some domestic courts may reciprocally tol-
erate executing judgments of “foreign nations” because they are
involved in a sort of “horizontal relationship” between two
equally national judicial bodies agreeing to enforce judgments
delivered by each other. This intercourt horizontal relationship
differs from the “vertical relationship” that appears to govern
the rapport between international courts and domestic courts.
In light of the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal
for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the ICTY and national
courts have concurrent jurisdiction to prosecute persons for se-
rious violations of international humanitarian law within the
ICTY’s competence; but the International Criminal Tribunal
243. Michaels, supra note 216, para. 6.
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has primacy over national courts.244 At any stage of the proce-
dure, the ICTY may formally request the national courts to de-
fer to its competence.245 The primacy of the international court
over the domestic court is also clearly replicated in the Statute
of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR).246
In the context of African countries, the relevant question is:
Does the supposed supremacy of international tribunals entail
many countries to not cooperate and comply with international
judicial bodies’ orders, such as the ICC? From a legal view-
point, this is not the case. Unlike the ICTY and ICTR, there is
no primacy clause in the Statute of Rome on the ICC. The rela-
tionship between the ICC and the domestic courts is based on
complementarity rather than the primacy of the former. The
point is that numerous governments in Africa, or elsewhere,
244. U.N. TRIBUNAL FOR THE PROSECUTION OF PERSONS RESPONSIBLE FOR
SERIOUS VIOLATIONS OF INT’L HUM. L. COMMITTED IN THE TERRITORY OF THE
FORMER YUGOSLAVIA SINCE 1991, UPDATED STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA art. 9, paras. 1, 2 (2009),
http://www.icty.org/x/file/Legal%20Library/Statute/statute_sept09_en.pdf.
Article 9 states:
1. The International Tribunal and national courts shall have concur-
rent jurisdiction to prosecute persons for serious violations of inter-
national humanitarian law committed in territory of the former Yu-
goslavia since 1 January 1991. 2. The International Tribunal shall
have primacy over national courts. At any stage of the procedure, the
International Tribunal may formally request national courts to defer
to the competence of the International Tribunal in accordance with
the present Statute and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the
International Tribunal.
Id.
245. Id.
246. In 1994, the U.N. Security Council resolved:
1. The International Tribunal for Rwanda and national courts shall
have concurrent jurisdiction to prosecute persons for serious viola-
tions of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of
Rwanda and Rwandan citizens for such violations committed in the
territory of neighboring States, between 1 January 1994 and 31 De-
cember 1994. 2. The International Tribunal for Rwanda shall have
the primacy over the national courts of all States. At any stage of the
procedure, the International Tribunal for Rwanda may formally re-
quest national courts to defer to its competence in accordance with
the present Statute and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the
International Tribunal for Rwanda.
S.C. Res. 955, art. 8 (Nov. 8, 1994)
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are reluctant to acknowledge the jurisdiction of and/or comply
with injunctions of supranational or supraregional (judicial)
institutions in the name of national sovereignty.247 However,
from the normative perspective, in ratifying an international
treaty that recognizes the jurisdiction of an international court,
the ratifying State and its organs (including the Government,
Parliament, and Court) are bound to give effect to the con-
cerned treaty.248 Therefore, the ratifying State should not play
the “national-sovereignty card” in order to avoid complying
with international judgments.
III. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE ENFORCEMENT OF
INTERNATIONAL JUDGMENTS
In light of the challenges for the enforcement of international
judgments, the following recommendations are suggested in
order to increase the probability of compliance with the deci-
sions of international courts.
A. Legal Reforms to Empower the Domestic Courts to Enforce
International Judgments
The lack of explicit provisions in international, regional, and
national legislations that authorize the national tribunals to
adjudicate compliance issues with international judgments,
constitutes a challenge for the enforcement of judgments of in-
ternational and regional courts. Accordingly, reforming the
continental human rights instruments to incorporate such
stipulations would represent an important step towards full
compliance with the decisions of international human rights
courts. In the context of the African continent, the incorpora-
tion of such provisions would not really be innovative. Indeed,
some subregional economic integration community treaties in
Africa already have provisions that explicitly compel domestic
247. Bartram Brown, Primacy or Complementarity: Reconciling the Juris-
diction of National Courts and International Criminal Tribunals, 23 YALE J.
INT’L L. 383, 403 (1998).
248. By the virtue of the principle pacta sunt servanda, “every treaty in
force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good
faith.” See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 26, May 23, 1969,
115 U.N.T.S. 331. In the Flick case, the CCSA also ruled that the enforce-
ment of judgments and orders of international courts or tribunals by the do-
mestic courts are “based on international agreements that are binding on
South Africa.” See Zimbabwe v. Fick, 2013 (5) SA 325 (CC) ¶ 53 (S. Afr.).
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courts to enforce States’ compliance with the judgments of their
respective community tribunals. For instance, Article 44 of the
East African Community (EAC) Treaty states: “The execution
of a judgment of the Court which imposes a pecuniary obliga-
tion on a person shall be governed by the rules of civil proce-
dure in force in the Partner State in which the execution is to
take place.”249 According to the Economic Community of West
African States (ECOWAS) Protocol on the Community Court of
Justice,250 “Execution of any decision of the Court shall be in
form of a writ of execution, which shall be submitted by the
registrar of the Court to the relevant Member State for execu-
tion according to the rules of civil procedure of that Member
State.”251 There are similar stipulations in the treaties of the
Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
(COMESA)252 and the SADC.253 It should be noted that there is
249. East African Community Treaty, art. 44, Nov. 30, 1999,
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/other_treaties/text.jsp?file_id=173330.
250. Econ. Cmty of W. African States [ECOWAS], Supplementary Protocol
Relation to the Community Court of Justice, A/SP.1/01/05 (Jan. 19, 2005),
http://www.courtecowas.org/site2012/pdf_files/supplementary_protocol.pdf.
251. Id.
252. Under the Treaty of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern
Africa:
The execution of a judgment of the Court which imposes a pecuniary
obligation on a person shall be governed by the rules of civil proce-
dure in force in the Member State in which execution is to take
place. The order for execution shall be appended to the judgment of
the Court which shall require only the verification of the authentici-
ty of the judgment by the Registrar whereupon, the party in whose
favor execution is to take place, may proceed to execution in accord-
ance with the rules of civil procedure in force in that Member State.
Art. 40, Dec. 8, 1994, 34 I.L.M. 909.
253. Protocol on the Tribunal in the Southern African Development Com-
munity art. 32, Aug. 7, 2000, 32 I.L.M. 116. The protocol states that:
1. The law and rules of civil procedure for the registration and en-
forcement of foreign judgments in force in the territory of the State
in which the judgment is to be enforced shall govern enforcement. 2.
States and institutions of the Community shall take forthwith all
measures necessary to ensure execution of decisions of the Tribunal.
3. Decisions of the Tribunal shall be binding upon the parties to the
dispute in respect of that particular case and enforceable within the
territories of the States concerned. 4. Any failure by a State to com-
ply with a decision of the Tribunal may be referred to the Tribunal
by any party concerned. 5. If the Tribunal establishes the existence
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a remarkable difference between the provisions of these com-
munity treaties. On the one hand, the EAC and COMESA pro-
visions limit the competence of the domestic courts on solely
enforcing the pecuniary judgments. On the other hand, the
ECOWAS and SADC provisions extend the competence of do-
mestic courts to enforce both pecuniary and nonpecuniary
judgments. Given that most decisions of international and re-
gional courts (such as ICJ, ECtHR, or ACtHPR) consist of both
pecuniary and nonpecuniary remedial orders, amendments to
international and regional human rights instruments should
consider authorizing domestic courts to obligatorily enforce all
kinds of international judgments; failing to do so merely en-
courages partial compliance rather than full compliance.254
Additionally, reforming international legislation on the en-
forcement of international judgments would also necessitate
the amendments of national laws. Although the amendment of
national laws (as a result of international law reform), may not
constitute a notable issue for monist countries,255 it is a neces-
sity for most dualist countries.256 In dualist countries, such as
Ghana, South Africa, or Zimbabwe, the international treaties
duly ratified by the Executive branch of the government do not
have force of law in the domestic legal arsenal unless they have
been expressly given force by Acts of Parliament.257 In other
words, the national Parliaments of these respective countries
should pass laws authorizing their domestic courts to enforce
international judgments of international and regional human
rights courts.
of such failure, it shall report its finding to the Summit for the latter
to take appropriate action.
Id.
254. Oppong, supra note 10, at 120–21.
255. In a monist legal system, the treaties or agreements duly ratified or
approved shall, upon publication, prevail over Acts of Parliament, subject,
with respect to each agreement or treaty, to its application by the other par-
ty. See 1958 CONST. art. 55 (Fr.). 2005 CONST. art. 215 (Dem. Rep. Congo);
1996 CONST. art. 45 (Cameroon); 1991 CONST. art. 151 (Burk. Faso); 1992
CONST. art. 116 (Mali).
256. Oppong, supra note 10, at 127.
257. See Const. of Ghana, 1992n art. 75; S. AFR. CONST., 1998, art. 231;
Const. of Zimbabwe, 1979, art. 111B.
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B. Increasing the Power of NHRIs in Monitoring the Enforce-
ment of International Judgments
As earlier mentioned, NHRIs are the domestic human rights
“watch dogs” in their respective African countries, and the Pro-
tocol on the Statute of the ACJHR has recognized their right to
directly lodge complaints before the ACJHR for human rights
violations committed in their countries. Explicitly increasing
the power of the NHRIs would allow them to not only promote
and protect human rights at the national level, but also to mon-
itor the enforceability of international and regional human
rights courts by the domestic courts. Granting NHRIs more
power would ensure that the beneficiaries of international
judgments would get their favorable verdicts enforced by do-
mestic courts in a fair and timely manner.
Some may be skeptical about the practicability of having Af-
rican domestic courts enforce international judgments, given
that many judgments rendered by local tribunals on local dis-
putes are not executed. How can African domestic courts en-
force international judgments when their own local decisions
are not enforced? For instance, in the DRC, only 40 percent of
the decisions rendered by Congolese courts on local disputes
are effectively executed.258 Many parties can wait decades with
a favorable Court decision before actually receiving the finan-
cial reparations granted to them by the Courts.259 This problem
is mostly related to issues of political interference, administra-
tive dysfunction, and corruption within the justice system ra-
ther than a “purely juridico-judicial” problem.
CONCLUSION
The purpose of this article was not only to explore the practi-
cal and legal reasons preventing the African governments from
fully complying with the judgments of international human
rights judicial bodies, but to also recommend certain actions
that would likely increase the enforceability of African courts’
remedial orders in Africa. The noncompliance or partial com-
258. Kinshasa: 60% des Jugements Rendus par les Tribunaux ne son pas
Executés [Kinshasa: 60% of the Judgments Delivered by the Courts are not
Executed], RADIO OKAPI (May 15, 2012),
http://radiookapi.net/actualite/2012/05/15/kinshasa-60-des-jugements-rendus-
par-les-tribunaux-ne-sont-pas-executes-des-pressions-politiques/.
259. Id.
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pliance of African countries with human rights courts’ decisions
is linked to numerous variables, including: the politicization of
the postadjudicative phase, coupled with the lack of sanctions
against defaulting States; the nonexistence of a judicial en-
forcement mechanism at regional and domestic levels; the mis-
use of the notion of sovereignty on judicial issues; and more
importantly, the lack of participation of domestic courts in the
postadjudicative stage of the international proceedings.260 Em-
powering domestic courts to have jurisdiction over noncompli-
ance with the judgments of international courts would increase
the likelihood that the beneficiaries of international judgments
could get their verdicts enforced by approaching the municipal
courts of the defaulting States and parties. Accordingly, this
paper suggests reforming both continental and domestic laws
to incorporate provisions that would authorize domestic courts
to adjudicate on the enforcement of international judgments.
However, this kind of legal reform cannot be materialized
without a certain degree of political willingness on the part of
States’ representatives. Therefore, it is important for States to
take effective actions regarding their commitments to promot-
ing and respecting the human rights provisions that they have
signed.
260. See supra Part II.
